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Abstract 
This paper describes and critically refects on a participatory policy process which resulted in a government decision not to
introduce genetically modifed (GM) cotton in farmers’ felds in Mali (West Africa). In January 2006, 45 Malian farmers
gathered in Sikasso to deliberate on GM cotton and the future of farming in Mali. As an invited policy space convened by
the government of Sikasso region, this frst-time farmers’ jury was unique in West Africa. It was known as l’ECID—Espace
Citoyen d’Interpellation Démocratique (Citizen’s Space for Democratic Deliberation)—and it had an unprecedented impact
on the region. In this Deliberative and Inclusive Process (DIP), the ECID combined the citizens’ jury method with indigenous
methods for debate and dialogue, including the traditional African palaver. The ECID brought together male and female
producers representing every district in the Sikasso region of southern Mali, specialist witnesses from various continents and
a panel of independent observers, as well as resource persons and members of the national and international press and media.
As an experiment in deliberative democracy, the ECID of Sikasso aimed to give men and women farmers the opportunity to
share knowledge on the benefts and risks of GM cotton, and make policy recommendations on the future of GM technol-
ogy in Malian agriculture. Designed as a bottom-up and participatory process, the ECID’s outcomes signifcantly changed
national policy on the release of GM technology and have had an enduring infuence in Mali. In this paper, we describe our
positionality as action researchers and co-organisers of the ECID. We explain the methodology used for the ECID of Sikasso
and critically refect on the safeguards that were put in place to ensure a balanced and trustworthy deliberative process. The
ECID and its key outcomes are discussed in the context of the political economy of GM cotton in West Africa. Last, we
briefy highlight the relevance of the ECID for current international debates on racism in the theory and practice deliberative 
democracy; the production of post-normal transdisciplinary knowledge for technology risk-assessments; and the politics of
knowledge in participatory policy-making for food and agriculture. 
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Introduction 
Mirroring its colonial past, West Africa today is at the
receiving end of externally-led interventions designed to




























         




































Tsan et al. 2019; Agrilinks 2020). Peasant family farmers
who represent the majority of agricultural producers in the
region (Lowder et al. 2016) are expected to modernise by
adopting genetically modifed crops (Dowd-Uribe 2014; 
Rock 2018; Schnurr 2019; Luna 2020) and embrace tech-
nologies promoted by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in
Africa (Patel 2013; Moseley et al. 2017; AGRA 2020) and
the World Economic Forum (WEF 2018). In this context, the
“issue of concern is who makes the choice of technology.
Normally, the ones least afected by that choice are the ones
responsible for determining that choice, while those forced
to live with that technology have the least say in the matter”
(Heyzer 1986, p. 7). 
The absence of farmers’ voices in decisions which afect
their lives refects deeply unjust power relations and a poli-
tics of exclusion that efectively silences a majority of men
and women in rural West Africa. This democratic defcit
in policy-making and technological choices is a global
phenomenon that is widely acknowledged in the literature
(Dryzek 2010; Fishkin 2011; Jasanof 2016; Testart 2015; 
Pimbert 2018a). 
In response to this democratic defcit, several actors in
scientifc and policy communities often place deliberative
innovations such as citizens’ juries, consensus conferences,
deliberative polls, citizens’ assemblies, and other such mini-
publics1 at the centre of their hopes for deliberative and
inclusive democracy (Pimbert and Wakeford 2001; Goodin
and Dryzek 2006; Grӧnlund et al. 2015; Fishkin and Mans-
bridge 2017; Wironen et al. 2019; Campbell and Crittenden
2019; OECD 2020). However, it is noteworthy that surveys
of peer-reviewed journal articles show that very few mini-
publics have been organised in the global South over the
last twenty years (Wakeford et al. 2008; Elstub and Escobar
2019). Most research on mini-publics and deliberative pro-
cesses focusses on Europe and North America (Goodin and
Dryzek 2006; Smith 2009; Elstub and Escobar 2019). The
African palaver as a form of consensus-building and con-
fict resolution based on dialogue as well as the deliberative
methods used in Confucian, Islamic and indigenous cultures
are either absent or under-represented in a largely western-
centric academic literature. This is problematic because
democracy as deliberation and public reason is universal—it
is not just a western construct (Sen 2003). 
Moreover, the agendas of intersectional politics, anti-
racism, and decolonisation are rarely incorporated in the
theory and practice of deliberative democracy and its poli-
tics of knowledge (Squires 2010; Martinez Palacios 2016). 
Uneven power relations persist, and continue to shape the
Mini-publics are made up of small numbers of citizens, who may 
be self-selected or randomly selected from a larger population (Fung 
2003). 
minds, knowledge, and governance regimes of former colo-
nial states (Ngugi 1986; Mignolo 2007; Mignolo and Walsh
2018; Fanon 2021). Modernity is thereby rendered as Euro-
pean and this maintains the ongoing erasure of colonised
cultures, races, and knowledges in institutional and policy
choices (de Sousa 2008; Bhambra 2014a; Bradley and Her-
rera 2016; Kelly et al. 2020). Enduring patriarchal relations
also discriminate against women participating in decision-
making (Goetz 1997; Hooks 2004; Federici 2012). 
By and large, current mind-sets, epistemologies of knowl-
edge, and governance regimes continue to be marked by
these colonial, racist and patriarchal logics (Ngugi 1986; 
Crenshaw 1991; Dussel 1993; Scheurich and Young 1997; 
Grosfoguel 2007, 2011, 2013; Bhambra 2014a, 2014b; 
Mies 2014; de Sousa 2015; Bhattacharya 2017; Salleh
2017; Mignolo and Walsh 2018; Neajai Pailey 2019). For
example, in a recent webinar several African citizens com-
plained about how The Gates Foundation’s complex web of
funded relations and scientifc networks works to exclude the
knowledge of small and family farmers from national deci-
sions on food and farming (CAGJ-AGRA Watch 2020). The 
disproportionate infuence which this US-based foundation
has on African agriculture was seen as colonial and inap-
propriate, particularly in the light of recently documented
failures of AGRA projects funded by The Gates Founda-
tion (Wise 2020). Overall, webinar participants echoed the
more general view that “In Africa, the research agenda…. 
and ‘given’ conceptual frameworks should be continuously
re-examined … with the aim of eschewing all manifestations
of new-colonial underpinnings and emphasizing indigenous
ideas” (Ezeanya 2011, p. 10). 
This paper describes and critically refects on a participa-
tory policy process which resulted in a government decision 
not to introduce genetically modifed (GM) cotton in farm-
ers’ felds in Mali (West Africa). Most notably, the knowl-
edge, analysis, priorities, and voices of Malian men and
women farmers were at the centre of the deliberations that
generated recommendations which changed national policy.
Indigenous ideas also helped design the method used for this
deliberative and inclusive process in Mali. As an invited
policy space convened by the government of Sikasso region,
this frst-time farmers’ jury was unique in West Africa. It
was known as l’ECID—Espace Citoyen d’Interpellation
Démocratique (Citizen’s Space for Democratic Deliberation)
on GMOs and the future of farming in Mali—and it had an
unprecedented impact on the region. 
Worldwide, the ECID of Sikasso is one of the very few
mini-publics that has directly infuenced policy making to
date. Indeed, this positive example from Africa is “outnum-
bered by cases where a mini-public is established but turns
out to have little or no efect on public decision-making”
(Dryzek 2010, p. 170). 
1 



































































This paper is written ffteen years after the ECID took
place in January 2006, and we want to briefy explain why.
As action researchers, we helped design the ECID and con-
tinue to be involved in follow up activities today. We wrote
this paper in direct response to recent requests made by dif-
ferent actors in West Africa who have asked for detailed
published information on the ECID’s methodology and its
overall design. This is because they wish to use the ECID’s
process-oriented methodology to facilitate citizen delibera-
tions on two critical issues in their region: 
i) Public health impacts of releasing genetically male-
sterile mosquitoes in the wild to reduce the transmission
of malaria in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Ivory Coast. This
biotechnology project is led by Target Malaria, a research
consortium funded by The Gates Foundation and the Open
Philanthropy Project Fund. Farmer and civil society organi-
sations2 have asked for details on methods that could be used
to design a transparent process of citizen deliberations on the
risks and benefts of mass feld-releases of GM male-sterile
mosquitoes. 
ii) Today’s spiralling political conficts, inter-ethnic and
religious violence in Mali require bold approaches for con-
fict resolution and peace-building based on deliberative
and inclusive governance (Yárnoz 2020). There is grow-
ing empirical evidence which shows that the use of mini-
publics and deliberative practices in deeply divided societies
can enable recognition, mutual understanding, constructive
social learning about the other side, and even solidarity
across deep diferences (O’Flynn 2007; Luskin et al. 2014). 
Several former members of the government of Mali3 have
asked the authors to fully describe the methodologies used
in the ECID of Sikasso for these reasons. 
In this paper, we frst briefy describe the context that
gave birth to the ECID on GMOs and the future of farming
in Mali. We also clarify our positionality as researchers and
authors of this paper. Second, we describe in detail the meth-
odology and process used to put the perspectives of African
farmers at the centre of the ECID. Next, we critically refect
on the methodological safeguards that were put in place to
ensure a balanced and credible deliberative process in which
hitherto excluded actors had more voice and agency. Last,
2 The main organisations asking for methodological guidance are (i) 
CNOP—the National Coordination of Peasant Organisations of Mali; 
(ii) ROPPA—the Network of Peasant Organisations and Agricul-
tural Producers in West Africa; (iii) COPAGEN – Coalition for the 
Protection of African Genetic Resources; (iv) IRPAD—Institute for 
Research and Promotion of Alternatives in Development. 
3 Over the last 14  months, the former Malian Minister of Higher 
Education and Scientifc Research (Dr. Assétou Samaké) and the for-
mer Minister for Territorial Administration and Local Communities 
(Dr. Ousmane Sy) have asked the authors for detailed information on 
the safeguards needed for balanced and trustworthy deliberations on 
sensitive issues. 
we briefy analyse some of the ECIDs impacts on policy
and practice. 
Context and positionality of researchers 
National and regional context 
The ECID took place at a time when almost four million
farmers were engaged in cotton farming in Mali, account-
ing for between 50 and 75% of the country’s total export
earnings (CMDT 2008). Income generation from the sale
of cotton is linked to food security (Cooper and West 2016; 
FAO 2017). 
Through the state cotton company (CMDT—Compagnie
Malienne de Développement des Textiles or Malian Textile
Development Company), the Mali Government controls
all the key links in the cotton value chain. Since the early
2000s, the sector has been experiencing a crisis caused by
a decrease in international cotton prices, lower yields, and
difculties in sector management. The CMDT, 60% of which
is owned by the state and 40% by the French company DAG-
RIS, was losing money following the devaluation of the CFA
franc and the collapse of the global cotton market, despite
the fact that between 1994 and 2005 annual production rose
from 320,000 to 600,000 tonnes (Forum pour l’Autre Mali
2004; Hugon 2005). Moreover, cotton production in Mali
is causing increased environmental degradation, in large
part owing to chemical inputs such as synthetic pesticides,
increased tillage, and cotton’s high nutrient demands (Mose-
ley 2005). In Mali, cotton accounts for about 44% of all
pesticides sold—with insecticides (52%) being most widely
used, followed by herbicides (31%), then fungicides (10.8%).
The use of certain hazardous pesticides by small farmers
has signifcantly increased risks to human health and the
environment (Jepson et al. 2014; SAICM 2019). 
It was in this context of crisis in the cotton industry that
researchers from the Institut d’Economie Rurale in Mali pro-
posed a fve-year plan with the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) to develop and commercialise GM
cotton, starting with feld testing in 2004 (GRAIN 2004). 
According to its proponents, a signifcant reduction in pes-
ticide use would be enabled by genetically engineering into
cotton plants the genes of Bacillus thuringiensis—a toxin-
producing bacterium found naturally in the soil. The result-
ing GM cotton plants—so called Bt cotton—would produce
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) toxins that kill susceptible insect
pests when they eat the plant (Tabashnik et al. 2003; Head
and Dennehy 2010). Cotton yields were projected to increase
with the reduction in pest-inficted losses on Bt cotton (Pur-
cell and Perlak 2004). Several peer reviewed articles pointed















    



























   
 
Fig. 1 Map of Mali (left) and districts in the Sikasso region (right) 
increasing yields and profts for millions of smallholder pro-
ducers in China, India, and South Africa (Pray et al. 2002; 
Qaim and Zilberman 2003 Morse et al. 2004). 
Around the same time, global seed corporations had
begun to actively shape the political economy of Bt cot-
ton cultivation in Africa. South Africa authorised the com-
mercialization of Monsanto’s insect-resistant (Bt) cotton in
1997—the frst GM crop in Africa. One year after its initial
release, Monsanto launched a campaign to increase adoption
of Bt cotton among smallholder farmers in the Makhathini
Flats region in South Africa (Dowd-Uribe and Schnurr
2016). In 2003, the government of Burkina Faso signed a
contract with Monsanto to test their insect-resistant Bt cotton
in experimental feld trials (Dowd-Uribe and Schnurr 2016; 
Luna and Dowd-Uribe 2020). Burkina Faso’s biosafety law
was enacted in 2006 and this greatly facilitated the feld tri-
als which led to the commercialisation of GM cotton in 2008
(Wafula et al. 2012). By 2010, about 80,000 farmers had
planted Bt cotton on 260,000 hectares with an adoption rate
of 65% (James 2010). More generally, public–private sector
partnerships for biotechnology were part of a growing trend
facilitated by international donors who brokered agreements
between seed companies and government scientists to lease
genetic material for use in Africa and promote GM crops
throughout the continent (Wafula et al. 2012; Schurman
2017; Schnurr 2019). Major funders facilitating research
and commercialization of GM crops in Africa include the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the
UK Department for International Development (DfID) as
well as The Rockefeller and Gates Foundations (Rock 2018; 
Russell 2018; Schnurr 2019). The discourse of these infuen-
tial donors emphasises genetic engineering as a moderniz-
ing, poverty-relieving, humanitarian technology (Mittal and
Moore 2009; Glover 2010; Schurman 2016). Inspired by
former United Nations Secretary-General Kof Annan’s call
for a uniquely African “green revolution”, The Rockefeller
and Gates Foundations founded in 2006 the Alliance for a
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), which they continue
to fund today. 
As farmer organisations, citizens, and some local govern-
ment ofcials became aware of plans to start feld testing
Bt cotton in Mali, there were growing calls for more infor-
mation and a public debate on the impacts of GM technol-
ogy on food and farming (ARdS 2005). Concerned citizens
pointed out that whilst cotton production is mostly destined
for the textile industry (cotton fbres), the oil produced by
refning cottonseed is used for human consumption and thus 
contributes to food and nutrition. Most of the cooking oil
used in Mali is derived from cotton plants and people were
concerned that insecticide-producing Bt cotton could make
cooking oil unft for human consumption.4 
In response to these public concerns, the ECID on geneti-
cally modifed organisms (GMOs) and the future of farming
in Mali was organised and held in Sikasso, from 25 to 29th
January 2006. Sikasso is in southern Mali (Fig. 1), where
4 The majority of Malians buy cotton oil for cooking because it is 
about half the price of imported oils. However, there have been cases 
of human poisoning caused by adulterated and poor quality cooking 
oil (The New Humanitarian, 2008). 




































       
      
 
  




























cotton is the principal engine of economic development,
generating benefts to farmers, rural communities, private
traders, cotton companies and the national government (Teft
2004). 
The ECID of Sikasso aimed to give men and women
farmers the opportunity to share knowledge on the benefts
and risks of GM cotton, and make policy recommendations
on the future of GM technology in Malian agriculture. It
brought together 45 male and female producers represent-
ing every district in the Sikasso region (Fig. 1), specialist
witnesses from various continents, a panel of independent
observers, as well as resource persons and members of the
national and international media. 
Authors positionality 
Our positionality is grounded in our experience of doing
participatory action research (PAR) on agroecology and
food sovereignty with indigenous and peasant communities
in West Africa as well as Asia, Europe and South America.
Over the last 30 years, we have accompanied and supported
indigenous and peasant movements for food sovereignty— 
often acting as listeners, catalysts, facilitators, advisors,
mediators, co-producers of knowledge, and enablers who
identify possible options for action by indigenous and peas-
ant communities. As co-organisers and co-facilitators of the
ECID we played all these roles at diferent times in the pro-
cess which we describe and refect on here. 
Our positionality and praxis emphasise (i) humanizing
relationships, deepening trust and building solidarity in
research practices; (ii) power equalizing relations that value
and enable non-academic agency in research; and (iii) trans-
formative change that reverses the current democratic defcit
in the production of knowledge and the governance of food
and agriculture. Ultimately, our positionality refects a com-
mitment to a power-equalising process in which hitherto-
excluded actors have more voice and agency to shape their
life world(s) (Community Media Trust et al. 2008; Pimbert
et al. 2017; Pimbert 2018a). Radically centring the excluded
in knowledge creation and decision-making is vital in our
theory of change: we see this as a site of transformative
knowledge and resistance, as do other scholars working
within anti-racist, anti-colonial, activist, and feminist tradi-
tions (Hooks 1994, 2000; Tuhiwai Smith 2012; Levkoe et al.
2018; Peoples’ Knowledge Editorial Collective 2017; Hall
and Tandon 2017). 
We are committed to nurturing a democratic political cul-
ture, rather than simply developing supposedly ideal delib-
erative designs. Our deliberative democratic practice is moti-
vated by a desire to open up multi-scalar social and political
space for widespread critical scrutiny of expert knowledge
and authorities by subalterns and excluded people. Funda-
mentally, our positionality refects a commitment to allow
deliberating “subjects to disrupt domination in its fullest
sense, by contributing to a form of ‘ongoing critical scru-
tiny’ autonomous and refective enough to resist and unmask
the hegemony inherent in both specifc authoritative acts
and more general discursive structures” (Böker 2017, p. 10). 
However, our positionality also embraces an allegiance
to rigorous and credible transdisciplinary research. Ensur-
ing the quality and validity of the knowledge and actions
generated by the ECID were central concerns for us as co-
organisers and facilitators. From the start we recognized
that our values, subjectivity, and worldview could poten-
tially infuence our actions as researchers and our interpreta-
tions of events. We therefore tried to build strong safeguards
into the ECID process to ensure it was generally credible,
trustworthy, fair, and not captured by any interest group or
perspective. We aimed for methodological rigour but we did
not attempt to satisfy naïve notions of ‘objective truth’. As
action researchers our primary focus was to meet broader
criteria of process validity—including inclusivity and qual-
ity of deliberation, diverse control, transparency, practi-
cal outcomes, empowerment, and enduring consequences
(Bradbury and Reason 2001). 
Methodology: methods and process 
Action research was the distinct epistemological approach
for our research and knowledge production (Reason and
Bradbury 2013). It is methodologically distinct from other
research approaches in that it explicitly aims to generate
knowledge for action; recognises and values experiential,
non-academic ways of knowing; and consciously contests
hierarchies of knowledge (Fine et al. 2007). Within our
iterative cycles of refection, planning and action (Online
Appendix Box A), we used specifc methods and processes
to co-produce, gather, analyse, and disseminate information. 
Methods 
This paper mainly draws on 15 months of action research
conducted in Mali between May 2005 and July 2006. The
crucial data for this paper comes from 106 interviews and
recordings of the deliberations and palavers that took place
during the ECID of Sikasso—including the preparatory pro-
cess, the ECID’s hearings, outcomes, and immediate policy
impacts. The paper also includes some data gathered during
further cycles of action research between 2006 and 2020.5 
5 During that 15  year period, we conducted a total of 364 inter-
views of cotton farmers, government ofcials, donor representatives, 
employees of non-governmental organisations, commercial seed com-
panies, media professionals, and public and private sector researchers. 
These interviews are analysed in a forthcoming paper on the long-
term impacts of the ECID. The ECID of Sikasso was one part of a 






































































We used semi-structured qualitative interviews to triangulate
and deepen our understanding of issues as they emerged
during and after the ECID’s deliberations. Interviews with
farmers were mostly conducted in Bambara (the main local
language which one of us speaks fuently). Triangulation
of information was also aided through the analysis of daily
audio and video flm recordings of participants’ comments,
questions, answers, and deliberations. As participant-observ-
ers, we also drew on our personal research diaries and notes
made during the ECID’s hearings, feld visits, workshops,
and policy dialogues. We relied on methods for participatory
learning and visualisation (Pretty et al. 1995; Salas and Till-
mann 2010) as well as methods for Deliberative and Inclu-
sive Processes (DIPs) (Pimbert and Wakeford 2001; Involve 
2020) to facilitate social interactions, team dynamics, and
the processes described next. Methods used to select farmer-
jurors are detailed in the Online Appendix. 
Other organisers and participants in the ECID were not
involved in the production of this paper; but they did pro-
vide comments and data which they validated and agreed to
share with us for our analysis.6 The role of oversight panel
members in validating our in situ analysis and choice of par-
ticipant quotes included in this paper is described below. We
combined our ethnographic observations with frst-person
inquiry (auto-ethnography) with audio and video recordings
for a critical analysis of the data generated in the participa-
tory process enabled by the ECID. 
The preparatory process: creating a democratic 
management structure 
A two-day workshop on ‘GMOs and citizens’ brought
together regional councillors and representatives of farmer
organisations, civil society organisations (CSOs), unions and
technical services from the Sikasso region in June 2005. The
workshop was convened by the elected regional government
of Sikasso province—l’Assemblée Régionale (the Regional
Assembly of Sikasso) (ARdS 2005). 
The main outcome of the workshop was the decision to
organise a public debate on the benefts and risks of GM
cotton for farming in Mali. Participants agreed that citizen
deliberations should take place under the auspices of the
Regional Assembly. A multi-actor Steering Committee (SC)
was set up to organise the deliberative process and included
representatives from a diversity of public, private and civil
society organisations as well as the President of the Regional
Assembly (Online Appendix, Box B). 
Unless stated otherwise in this paper, the quotes from participants 
all came from the documentation of the ECID process, our personal 
notes, and our follow-up research interviews. 
All organisations represented on the SC were from Mali
except for two: the Réseau Interdisciplinaire de Biosécu-
rité (RIBios—IUED7 in Switzerland) and the International
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED in the
UK). The Regional Assembly government of Sikasso had
invited representatives of the RIBios-IUED and IIED to be
part of the SC in order to provide conceptual and methodo-
logical support, and also to seek funding support (ARdS
2005). More specifcally, the Regional Assembly (AR) and
its President asked the co-authors of this paper to lead on the
organisation of deliberations on GM cotton because we were
both known to have extensive experience in designing and
facilitating participatory processes. However, the govern-
ment of Sikasso (AR) also expected to be closely involved in
key decisions related to process and more strategic choices.
Whilst we were asked to lead, our mandate was revocable at
any time if the AR felt that activities were not aligned with
the collectively agreed approach of the Steering Committee. 
Along with our positionality, this direct request from the
AR was a key impetus for us and explains why and how we
organised the deliberative process described here. 
The entire SC agreed that the deliberative process should
enable producers—men and women—to: 
1. Better understand GMOs and their associated risks and
benefts—particularly GM cotton in Mali. 
2. Hear diferent viewpoints on the pros and cons of GM
technology, and talk to experts on both sides of the
GMO debate to reach an informed opinion. 
3. Formulate policy and practical recommendations on the 
future role of GMOs in Malian agriculture. 
To ensure fexible planning and timely implementation,
the Steering Committee set up an Executive Committee (EC)
that included the authors of this paper (Online Appendix,
Box C). This EC was responsible for the logistical organi-
sation and facilitation of the inclusive process. It was man-
dated to report back regularly and to discuss next steps with
the larger Steering Committee. 
Both the Executive and Steering Committees worked in
an iterative manner through recurring cycles of refection,
planning and action to ensure that the entire deliberative pro-
cess emerged in a fexible, responsive and adaptive manner
(Online Appendix, Box A). 
The EC established an independent Oversight Panel. Its
role was to assess the credibility, fairness, competence and
trustworthiness of the ECID process and its outcomes. The
EC chose Oversight Panel members (Online Appendix, Box 
D) based on their reputation for integrity in Malian society
7 IUED: Institut Universitaire d’Etudes du Développement (Univer-
sity Institute for Development Studies). 
6 



































































   
  
 
      
      
and government circles, their knowledge of deliberative pro-
cesses, expertise in biosafety issues and risk assessments,
gender balance and knowledge of African farming and rural
development in Mali. This careful balancing act was guided
by previous citizens’ juries, and aimed to include a broad
range of interests and perspectives without any one of them
dominating (Coote and Lenaghan 1997). However, the panel
was not so broad-based as to include potentially disruptive
individuals opposed to the democratic accountability of cor-
porations and governments. 
Panel members included a majority of West African
nationals and some Europeans with working experience in
francophone Africa. Most notably, the panel was chaired by
Mr Ousmane Sy who headed the Commission for Decen-
tralization and Institutional Reform in Mali before serving
as Minister for Territorial Administration and Local Com-
munities in the national government. 
During the preparatory phase, the Oversight Panel regu-
larly discussed progress with the Executive Committee.
Members were asked to review and validate key decisions
as well as methods used (e.g. farmer-juror selection) and
choices made (e.g. specialist witnesses). During the ECID
itself, Oversight Panel members directly observed the pro-
ceedings, freely interacted with participants, and met daily
with the organisers to comment on the quality of the pro-
cess and suggest possible improvements to facilitation. At
the end of each day of the ECID, the oversight panel mem-
bers and the co-authors of this paper met and did an in situ
analysis of participants comments by asking critical ques-
tions such as why a statement was made, by whom, how,
and what was its impacts on the construction of collective
knowledge. This daily participatory data analysis used logi-
cal reasoning and triangulation to gain crucial information
from the ECID’s hearings. The in situ analysis also allowed
the oversight panel to validate the derived knowledge and its
evidence base, as part of an extended peer review process.
Agreements were reached on the most signifcant insights
and comments made by farmer jurors, specialist witnesses,
and oversight panel members. This analysis has guided the
choice of specifc quotes cited in this paper. 
Defning the methodology for a deliberative 
and inclusive process 
The ECID was the frst ever deliberative technology assess-
ment organised in West Africa. It combined two methodo-
logical innovations—one from Mali and the other from
Europe and the USA. 
The Malian method—the Espace Communal 
d’Interpellation Démocratique (CSDD or Communal Space 
for Democratic Deliberation)—is largely based on previous
initiatives to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the
decentralisation process in the Sikasso region. During the
1990s, civil society groups worked with government of-
cials to develop the CSDD to allow citizens living in the
Sikasso’s districts to call to account elected mayors and non-
government organisations (NGOs) for any shortcomings in
public services and other interventions. Prior to January
2006, two CSDDs had been organised in the Sikasso region
(Centre Djoliba 2003). They had allowed many villagers to
call out and question local mayors and NGOs on the misuse
of funds and failures to deliver essential services (education,
health, transport, water supply, public infrastructure devel-
opment….). Lasting two to three days, these CSDDs primar-
ily intended to facilitate a direct and frank dialogue between
the local population and their elected politicians. Their main
aim was to strengthen mutual listening and trust rather than
frame policy recommendations or develop a position. 
The Steering Committee members agreed that the local
CSDD model was not entirely appropriate for a nuanced
and inclusive deliberative process on GMOs and farming
in Mali. For example, while the CSDDs were set up to call
elected local ofcials to account, for a topic like GMOs
questions needed to be answered by national and interna-
tional experts (specialist witnesses) representing contrasting
views from the public and private sectors, NGOs, farmer
organisations, universities, etc. These specialist witnesses
needed to be able to answer producers’ questions and pro-
vide clear information on the benefts and risks of GMOs in
food and farming—not only in scientifc and technical terms,
but also from a socio-economic, political, ethical and cul-
tural angle. The CSDD model needed to be further refned
to ensure a fair and meaningful debate on GM technology
and its possible impacts. 
The citizens’ jury was identifed as a useful process to
combine with the CSDD approach. Developed in the early
1970s by the Jeferson Center in the United States8 and
in Germany,9 the citizens’ jury is a participatory action
research method that involves between 8 and 20 non-special-
ist citizens who listen to and question specialist witnesses on
a technical subject over the course of about fve days. The
witnesses present contrasting perspectives on the issue under
debate and are cross-questioned by jurors, guided by one or
more neutral facilitators or a chairperson. Unlike the CSDD,
the citizens’ jury does give a verdict and policy recommen-
dations that are made public at the end of the deliberative
process, usually in the form of a short report. 
Elements of the local CSDD and the citizens’ jury
method were thus combined. The resulting methodologi-
cal hybrid was called the Espace Citoyen d’Interpellation
Démocratique (ECID—the Citizens’ Space for Democratic
Deliberation). Further decisions about the methodological

























































   
  
 
Table 1 Profle of farmer- Initial selection criteria Actual participants 
jurors selected for the ECID of 
Sikasso Type of farm Type of farm 
A (large) 15% A 17.8% (7 men and 1 woman) 
B (medium) 35% B 33.3% (14 men and 1 woman) 
C (small, hand plough used) 20% C 17.8% (7 men and 1 woman) 
D (small, use of hand tool—the daba) 30% D 28.9% (2 men and 11 women) 
Overall gender balance (number of women) >30% 31.1% (14 women) 
requirements for a rigorous, transparent and fair process to
assess technological risks and associated development poli-
cies were informed by previous experiences with citizens’
juries (Pimbert and Wakeford 2001; Pimbert et al. 2003; 
Goodin and Dryzek 2006).10 
The African palaver was at the heart of the ECID,
anchoring farmers’ deliberations in a time-tested cultural
and political tradition in Mali. Invented by Africans, the
art of palaver is the most ancient form of governance and
democracy (Diangitukwa 2014). Palaver style listening and
discussion were encouraged during the ECID because this
informal approach is relatively friendly, horizontal, pacifc
and generally open (Robert 2006). Organisers also felt that
the palaver would enhance the quality and validity of the
deliberative process because the “object of the palaver is the
search for what is real, true and good for the community and
for each of its members…It is a dynamic driven by a sense
of community and seeking to preserve, restore and grow
interpersonal communion” (Peeters 2020, p. 2). 
Ensuring an unbiased selection of farmer‑jurors 
A total of 269 farmers were initially selected through strati-
fed random sampling in all districts of the Sikasso region
(Fig. 1). Additional criteria were then used to identify a
total of 45 farmer-jurors from this random sample. Details
of the selection process and methods used can be found in
the Online Appendix. 
After reviewing the entire farmer-jury selection process,
the Oversight Panel validated the fnal composition of the
ECID’s panel of farmer-jurors. Overall, the profle of pro-
ducers who participated in the ECID aligned well with initial
quotas and selection criteria (Table 1). 
Open framing of the ECID 
Recognising that there are situated knowledges and partial
objectivities (Sundberg 2017), we were careful to allow the
selected farmers to also frame the scope of the ECID. In
the four months prior to the ECID, farmer jurors were able
to decide on the framing of the ECID in each of the seven
districts of the Sikasso region (Fig. 1). As co-facilitators
of these discussions, we avoided narrowly concentrating on
GM per se and encouraged farmers instead to discuss and
locate the issue in the broader context of their own social,
economic, and political concerns. These discussions by the
farmer-jurors stretched the initial framing of questions on
GM crops per se to include a consideration of impacts on
the future of farming in Mali. Through this iterative partici-
patory process (Online Appendix Box A), both farmers and
Steering Group members agreed that the ECID should focus
on ‘GMOs and the Future of Farming in Mali’. 
Selecting specialist witnesses 
A crucial part of the ECID depended on identifying individ-
uals willing and able to defend a particular vision of GM and
farming futures in Mali. Specialist witnesses were invited
to help inform discussions on GM cotton and its impacts
on the future of farming. Their role was to clearly explain
issues, present a viewpoint, advocate a position, summa-
rise existing evidence and respond to questions asked by
the farmer-jurors. 
All specialist witnesses were formally invited by the
President of the Sikasso Regional Assembly (AR) follow-
ing Steering Committee recommendations. Each potential
specialist witness was carefully briefed about the purpose
of the ECID and their expected role. Specialist witnesses
who agreed to participate in the ECID were asked to prepare
a 45-min presentation to communicate their expertise in a
clear and accessible manner to an audience of non-scientists.
Specialist witnesses also had to agree in advance to answer
any questions asked by farmer-jurors—both immediately
after their public presentation and later if called back by
Citizens’ juries have been used in the debate on GMOs in India, the farmer-jurors to give further evidence or clarifcationsBrazil, Zimbabwe and the UK (Coote and Lenaghan 1996; Pimbert 
and Wakeford 2002; Pimbert et  al. 2003; Wakeford and Pimbert during the ECID. 
2003). 
10 


























































The names of specialist witnesses and the evidence they
presented at the ECID on GMOs and the future of farming
in Mali are shown in Box F (see Online Appendix). At no
time were specialist witnesses allowed to interact and talk
with farmer-jurors outside of the ofcial hours for ECID
hearings.11 
The process and outcomes 
The ECID hearings took place over fve days between 25 and
29th January 2006, at the Centre Charles Langlois in Sikasso
(Online Appendix, Box A). 
Each specialist witness gave a presentation, which was
followed by farmers’ questions.12 As central actors in the
ECID process, the farmer-jurors carefully listened to and
interrogated the specialist witnesses. They weighed up
the pros and cons of GM cotton on the basis of their own
knowledge, new insights, priorities and aspirations. Men and
women participants critically engaged with specialist wit-
nesses, questioning them directly in plenary sessions. The 45
farmer jurors scrutinised the evidence and deliberated with
each other in small groups (known as commissions) based
on their gender and socio-professional status: 
• Group A: Large-scale producers (7 people) 
• Group B: Medium producers (14 people) 
• Group C and D: Small producers (10 people) 
• Women’s only group: 14 women from all categories of
producers. 
This methodological innovation allowed for four parallel
citizens’ juries to run side by side during the ECID. Each
commission thus acted as an enabling space for women and
men farmers with diferent wealth and social status (small,
medium and large producers). The African palaver (Dian-
gitukwa 2014) was a key feature of the dialogical and delib-
erative processes in each commission. 
Farmers were expected to work within their assigned
commission and also to interact with members of other com-
missions during the ECID’s plenary sessions. It was empha-
sised that the farmer-jurors’ main role was to deliberate on
11 All specialist witnesses were housed in local hotels in Sikasso and 
all farmer-jurors slept in the hostel of the Centre Charles Langlois in 
Sikasso. These separate accommodation arrangements allowed the 
farmer-jurors to continue their palavers and deliberations in the even-
ing without being interrupted or infuenced by specialist witnesses. 
The latter were in a separate location for their overnight accommoda-
tion and they were asked not to interact with farmer-jurors outside of 
the ECID’s formal hearings. 
12 Written versions are available at the Regional Assembly of 
Sikasso, Mali. 
what was best for everyone, and not just to represent them-
selves. The farmer-jurors were therefore asked to focus on
discussing what would be best for all categories of cotton
producers rather than just representing, say, small-scale or
large-scale farmers. 
Facilitating the process 
Skilled facilitators were essential for facilitating the deliber-
ations within the four commissions. The facilitators selected
needed good local language and communication skills (in
Bambara and French). Other important criteria included an
ability to help people with contrasting backgrounds and life
experiences to dialogue and work together, a sound knowl-
edge of livelihoods and rural conditions in Mali, experience
in village-level facilitation and confict resolution, and rep-
resentation of key sectors (government, academia and civil
society). Five male and two female facilitators were sought
to refect the ECID’s gender composition.13 In addition, two
translators14 (French–English) made it possible for English-
speaking specialist witnesses to participate in the event. 
One facilitator was assigned to work with the same com-
mission for the duration the ECID. 
The jury’s verdict and recommendations 
Each commission was tasked with generating its own set of
proposals and policy recommendations. The resulting sets of
policy recommendations were shared and validated in ple-
nary by all 45 farmer-jurors. The ECID’s ‘verdict’ and policy
recommendations of each commission are shown in Box 1. 
The 45 farmers-jurors unanimously rejected the introduc-
tion of GMOs to Mali. An Oversight Panel member who is
also a government expert on biosafety concluded: 
“….democratic debates during the forum enabled us
to fnd out what diferent producers think about the
short-, medium- and long-term use of GMOs in Mali.
This exercise clearly showed that there is widespread
opposition among local farmers and civil society
groups to the introduction of genetically modifed
crops, seed and products in Mali”. Mouhamadou
Traoré. 
The farmer-jurors’ recommendations were delivered to the
Sikasso Regional Assembly on 29 January 2006 (ARdS
2006). Whilst the recommendations made by the ECID were
not binding, they proved extremely infuential at the time. As
13 Mrs Sanogo Djeneba Coulibaly, Mrs Fatoumata Kone, M. Bouk-
ary Barry, M. Abdoulaye Boniface Dembele, M. Lassana Touba 
Fofana, M. Richard Toe and M. Sogoba Bougouna. 























































    
   
a direct result of the ECID, the government decided to indef-
initely delay the approval of legislation that needed to be in
place before GM crops could be introduced in Mali.15 This
outcome was partly due to the fact that Mali is a signatory
to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.16 Under proposed
legislation a public consultation was a pre-requisite at the
national level before the introduction of any GMOs, even for
testing. In this context, the ECID very clearly demonstrated
the ability of farmer-citizens to contribute to policy-making
processes. 
Box 1. Recommendations made by the four 
producers’ commissions 
Commission A (large-scale producers) 
•In view of the fact that 98% of producers in Mali operate
on a small scale, and that GMO production techniques
are only viable for large-scale producers, who account
for just 2% of all farmers, we believe that this technology
should not be introduced in Mali. 
•Given that there are unused stocks of seed produced by
our own researchers, and the possible unforeseen risks
associated with GMOs, we recommend greater focus on
unmodifed seed rather than GMO varieties 
•The lack of equipment and appropriate laboratories avail-
able to our researchers is another factor against the intro-
duction of GMO plants 
•Malian farmers will have to be trained in new technolo-
gies to enable them to manage their farms, so we oppose
the introduction of any other foreign bodies that they are
going to fnd hard to understand 
•Organic cotton production is already ongoing and viable
here in Mali. There is a market for it, it fetches a guar-
anteed minimum price, and it provides employment for
women—so Bt cotton production should be halted, not
encouraged 
•As farmers, we believe that taking the gene from a non-
native animal and introducing it into a plant is contrary
to our religious and social ethics 
15 The ECID’s recommendations were aimed at the Draft Bill on 
Biosafety of the Republic of Mali (2005). 
16 Adopted as part of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
Cartagena Protocol on the prevention of biotechnological risk is 
intended "to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection 
in the feld of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modi-
fed organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have 
adverse efects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health, and spe-
cifcally focusing on transboundary movements". https://bch.cbd.int/
protocol/background. Accessed 17 January 2021. 
Commission B (medium-sized producers) 
•Research eforts should focus on developing and improv-
ing traditional varieties, not transgenic ones 
•Producers should be involved in every stage of the
research process 
•The authorities need to work with producers on develop-
ing strategies to promote organic farming based on local
products, and turn away from agri-chemical inputs 
•The results of the ECID should be disseminated among
rural umbrella organisations, the Regional Assembly,
National Assembly, the Presidency and the media 
Commission C and D (small-scale producers) 
Our recommendations are made in the light of the vari-
ous specialist witness presentations, our own concerns,
the fact that certain major powers are resisting GMOs,
and that some of our food products contain GMOs: 
•No scientifc research on GMOs should be undertaken in
the name of Malian farmers as we are opposed to GMOs 
•No research programmes on GMOs should be authorised 
in Mali 
•A mechanism should be put in place to control and moni-
tor imported foodstufs to determine whether or not they
contain GMOs 
•The results of the ECID should be disseminated among
all the authorities and ofcials across the country 
•Arrangements should be put in place to share and report
back on the results of the ECID at the local level. 
Women’s commission (includes every category of
producer) 
•Local seed varieties should be conserved so that they
don’t disappear 
•Research should focus on local seed varieties 
•The authorities should ban the introduction of GMOs in
Mali 
•The spread of GMO genes into our local varieties should
be monitored and controlled 
•Producers who persist in growing GMOs should have
their crops burned, and the illicit production and distri-
bution of GMOs should be punished 
•The results of the ECID should be disseminated via pub-
lications and the media 
•A mechanism should be put in place to monitor food
products imported into Mali 
•Techniques for producing organic sesame and cotton
should be disseminated in every district in the region of
Sikasso 
•Women should be trained to produce organic sesame and
cotton 





















































•Farmer Field Schools should be made available and
accessible to more women 
•Women should be involved in large forums and assem-
blies 
The women farmers concluded by saying loud and
clear: 
“Yes to traditional seed varieties! No to GMOs! We
don’t want GMOs in Mali!” 
Process documentation and dissemination 
The whole ECID was recorded on digital video. The video
archives provide a clear and accurate record of the event,
including the location, the jury setting, the participants, the
nature and quality of the debates, the process and its out-
comes. The video archives were compiled to allow any party
or external agency to check for possible shortfalls in balance,
fairness or deliberative competence of the process.17 
Members of the press were invited to document the
hearings and outcomes of the ECID of Sikasso. The fol-
lowing national newspapers sent their correspondents to
observe and report on the deliberative process: Les Echos
and L’Indépendant, both from Mali; and Le Monde Diplo-
matique from France. A UK-based national newspaper, The
Independent, covered the fnal day and the results of the
ECID. Reporters and camera crews from national television
in Mali were also present, returning three times to flm and
interview participants at the beginning, middle and end of
the event. Reporters and technicians from seven commu-
nity radio stations were present—one from each of the seven
districts of the Sikasso region (Fig. 1). Local radio stations
were also present each day and were closely involved in the
ECID, recording and broadcasting both during the prepara-
tory phase and the event itself.18 
Refections on the quality and validity 
of the process 
Several safeguards were used to enhance the methodologi-
cal rigour, trustworthiness, and transparency of the ECID. 
17 The entire video archive is available from the Regional Assembly 
in Sikasso (Mali), the RIBios-IUED in Geneva (Switzerland) and the 
Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience at Coventry University 
(UK). 
18 Radio broadcasts were heard by at least 1.7 million people in 
Mali’s Sikasso region and also in some neighbouring districts of Bur-
kina Faso and Ivory Coast (Daouda Mariko, URTEL, personal com-
munication, April 2006). According to the 2009 census, the total pop-
ulation of the Sikasso region was 2,625,919. 
Diverse oversight and transparency 
The ECID of Sikasso focused on the risks and benefts of
GM cotton in dryland farming. It was designed to explore a
possibly dramatic transformation in the way cotton is pro-
duced and consumed—both as a fbre for the textile industry
and as an oil for human consumption in Mali. The promo-
tion of GM cotton as well as its real and imagined impacts
were all highly controversial issues in that context. It was
therefore crucial that this deliberative process was transpar-
ent and under the control of institutional actors with difer-
ent vested interests, social aims and visions of agricultural
development. 
Four primary safeguard mechanisms were built into the
ECID process with the explicit aim of enabling diverse con-
trol and transparency: 
1. The Oversight Panel. The panel had an explicit man-
date to assess the fairness, balance of plural perspec-
tive, and credibility of the ECID of Sikasso (see above).
Chaired by a former government minister for Territo-
rial Administration and Local Communities in Mali, the 
panel critically oversaw the entire process and system-
atically checked for possible biases and inconsistencies.
The panel members shared their observations with the
co-ordinating team at the end of each day of the farmer-
jurors’ deliberations. They ensured that all parts of the
process were continually evaluated by individuals with
a diverse array of perspectives. The panel also made
an overall evaluation of the ECID of Sikasso after the
formal closure of the event. 
2. The media observers and reporters. The semi-constant
presence of the media thus ensured another level of con-
trol and vetting of the ECID process. The wide reporting
of the event in the regional and national media high-
lighted the credibility and impartiality of the delibera-
tions that generated important policy recommendations
for Mali. 
3. Multi-stakeholder observers. Several other observers
were invited to witness the ECID process, on the under-
standing that they remain silent during the specialist
witness presentations and the jury deliberations. These
silent observers included other farmers from Mali and
neighbouring Burkina Faso, NGO representatives, agri-
cultural researchers, policy makers and planners, trade
union representatives and corporate sector representa-
tives. Whilst some stayed only two or three days, most
witnessed the whole event and all developed opinions
on the strengths and weaknesses of the process and were
able to communicate their views to members of the over-
sight panel, the co-ordinating team and the press. Their





















      
       











   
 
     
Fig. 2 An innovative, demo- Oversight and Extended Peer Review cratic and active extended peer 
review process 
4. The video archives. These allow any interested party or
external organisation to learn from this experience or
check for possible bias, shortfalls in balance, fairness or
deliberative competence of the process.19 
Diverse oversight and transparency were thus built into
the very design of the ECID of Sikasso. Moreover, control
over and scrutiny of the unfolding dynamics of the ECID
took place in real time and in situ. This multi-level scru-
tiny of the ECID (Fig. 2) allowed diferent participants to
co-construct their own knowledge and contest the validity
of that of others in an open deliberative arena. Most nota-
bly, the independent Oversight Panel members acted as an
extended peer review community that was able to directly
witness the dynamics of knowledge production and policy
formulation. The Oversight Panel had the power to decide
which methods and processes (representativeness of jury,
balance of witnesses, quality of facilitation…) were appro-
priate and what constituted valid knowledge in that context.
The video recordings also show what the ECID’s deliberations 
actually looked like. Filmed over 5 days, this archival video footage 
allows viewers to see the types of evidence presented by special wit-
nesses, the kinds of questions jurors asked, and how groups deliber-
ated amongst themselves. Additional video footage on what the pro-
cess and outcomes of the ECID can be accessed in an ethnographic 
flm shot during the hearings—Senekelaw Ka Kuma. Paroles de Pay-
sans. https://youtu.be/-4E2LGNneBQ. Accessed 12 December 2020. 
Video Film Archives 
Media (TV, radio, press) 







Commenting on the quality of the deliberative process and
its outcomes, the Chair summarised the opinion of the over-
sight panel members: 
“ The steering group undertook the preparations for
the ECID of Sikasso in a neutral, balanced and profes-
sional manner. Protagonists showed respect for each
other’s opinions during a healthy exchange of views.
There was a free and responsible debate on a matter of 
strategic importance for the future of Malian agricul-
ture”. Ousmane Sy. 
This innovation for extended peer review and oversight
(Fig. 2) sought to decentralise and democratise the produc-
tion and validation of knowledge as well as ensure that the
outputs of the ECID were as legitimate and representative
as possible. The oversight panel’s in-situ verifcation of
facts and real-time assessment of the quality and validity
of the ECID advanced the practice of post-normal science
and knowledge democracy (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; 
Benessia et al. 2016; Pimbert 2018b). Post-normal science
recognises that in a fast-changing world the facts are uncer-
tain, values are often in dispute, stakes are high and deci-
sions are urgent. Its core ideas include an ‘extended peer
community’ and the recognition of a diversity of legitimate
perspectives to construct and validate knowledge on every
issue (Ravetz 2006). 
Evaluation built 
into the process, -
not end of the 
pipe 
In situ monitoring 
and evaluation –  
in real time 
Extended peer 


































































Diverse control and funding 
Diverse control was also ensured in the ECID of Sikasso
by relying on diferent sources of funding. Funding for the
ECID of Sikasso mostly came from two donors who each
contributed close to 90% of the total budget: 
• the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
(SDC), Switzerland 
• the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Afairs (DGIS), The Neth-
erlands 
The Regional Assembly and other Malian partners
involved made a small fnancial contribution (10% in total).
However, they made important non-monetary donations and
human contributions which were decisive in ensuring strong
control over the ECID by locally and nationally accountable 
organisations. 
The ECID took place under the auspices of the Regional
Assembly of Sikasso, which is an integral part of the Mali
Government. In this sense, the ECID was an invited policy
space that was created and opened up from above by the
government, rather than from below on the initiative of citi-
zens (Cornwall 2004; Cornwall and Coelho 2006). There
was therefore a risk that the Regional Assembly might
unilaterally steer the process in its preferred direction and
towards its favoured policy outcomes. This has indeed been
a common practice in Europe where governments have
organised large-scale consultations and deliberative partici-
patory processes on GM technology (Dryzek and Tucker
2008; Levidow 2008; Levidow and Carr 2009; Aasen and
Vatn 2013). Some of these policy spaces commissioned and
created from above ended up closing down debate and/or
co-opting mini-publics.20 However, it is noteworthy that the
Regional Assembly of Sikasso respected inclusive decision
making and democratic control within a Steering Commit-
tee made up of very diferent institutional actors (Online
Appendix Box B). At no time did this regional government
attempt to take over the process, impose its views or cen-
sure critical and potentially subversive opinions in the ECID.
This positive outcome was partly due to the President of
the Regional Assembly’s clear commitment to democratic
Commissioning governments have often co-opted and trivialised 
deliberative processes when they create opportunities for agency and 
participation in policy making. In the late 1990s’, the UK govern-
ment’s much-publicised experiment in deliberative democracy ended 
up being condemned by its own Parliamentary Committee as “closer 
to market research than public consultation” (Irwin 2001, p. 74). In
the environmental feld too, available evidence indicates that there are 
strong dangers of co-option of green ideas and jury recommendations 
by the State (Dryzek 2000). There is always a danger for democracy 
when too much agenda-setting power is given to those who commis-
sion mini-publics. 
values, and partly because relatively powerful producer
organisations were represented on the Steering Committee
(Online Appendix Box B). The principle of diverse control
was thus enshrined and adhered to in the overall governance 
of the ECID of Sikasso. 
A diversity of specialist witnesses 
The diversity of witnesses ensured that key sectors of soci-
ety—government, farmer trade unions, civil society organi-
sations, business and research institutions -, contributed a
broad range of views on GMOs and the future of farming in
Mali (Online Appendix Box F). 
Members of the Oversight Panel seemed satisfed that
the specialist witness presentations efectively refected the
views of their diferent constituencies: 
Dr Mouhamadou Traore: “Expert witnesses with
highly divergent views on GMOs were invited to
attend the forum. The themes presented by these expert
witnesses gave participating producers access to con-
tradictory information on GMOs. As a result, expert
witnesses and producers were able to engage in mean-
ingful debates.” 
Mohamed Haidara: “The methodology has allowed
opinions in favour and against GM cotton to be fairly
presented and properly debated during the ECID”. 
Danielle Bütschi: “ ….the ECID was a balanced
forum, giving GM supporters and detractors equal
opportunities to air their views, particularly during the 
expert witnesses’ presentations. In quantitative terms,
a perfect balance was achieved”. 
However, a few institutional actors declined the invitation
to participate in the ECID. The absence of these key spe-
cialist witnesses meant that some arguments in favour of
particular models of agricultural development may not have
been represented as well as they could otherwise have been.
The non-appearance by the following four organisations is
especially noteworthy: 
• Monsanto Company, an agrochemical and agricultural
biotechnology corporation based in the USA,21 which is
a major promoter of GM cotton seeds in West Africa.22 
• Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture, a non-
proft organisation linked to the global company Syn-
genta AG that conducts genomic research and produces
agrochemicals and seeds. Syngenta Foundation’s mission
21 In 2018, Monsanto company was acquired by the German multina-
tional Bayer AG as part of its crop science division. 
22 Whilst Monsanto declined our invitation it did recommend a 
farmer who supported and promoted its technology: TJ Buthelezi. A 
Zulu farmer from South Africa, Mr Buthelezi had been growing Bt 
cotton since 1996 and agreed to be a specialist witness who would 



























































        
       
    
 
 
in Mali is to help farmers access quality, afordable seeds
of improved crop varieties. 
• DAGRIS (formerly CFDT and now GEOCOTON) is a
major industrial operator with a fully integrated cotton
value chain and a business partner to the biggest cotton
companies in West Africa, including Mali’s CMDT. 
• USAID, an international development agency and a
catalytic actor which promotes genetically engineered
crops in West Africa.23 Prior to the ECID of Sikasso,
the Government of Mali received much of its advice and
funding from USAID for the development of biosafety
regulations for GMOs. 
Despite several Regional Assembly invitations24 sent to
headquarters and national representatives of these organisa-
tions over a period of several months, Monsanto Company,
Syngenta Foundation, DAGRIS and USAID were unable to
participate in the ECID of Sikasso. In some cases, organisers
suspect they were rather unwilling to engage in this delibera-
tive process. In other cases, reasons for not taking part were
made crystal clear to the organisers. For example, Syngenta
Foundation did not authorise its chief scientist and repre-
sentative in Mali to give evidence as a specialist witness
because, “We are not going to participate in something we
cannot control” (Dr Andrew Bennett, Director of the Syn-
genta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture). In a previous
mini-public (Prajateerpu) in which Syngenta was specialist
witness, its GM vitamin A rice was rejected by a jury of
small Indian farmers in 2001 (Kuruganti et al. 2008). The
ensuing negative international publicity for Syngenta may
explain why it’s Foundation decided not to participate in the 
ECID. More generally, evidence shows that corporate actors
such as Syngenta, DAGRIS, and Monsanto have a long track
record of controlling the discourse and limiting debate on
policy and technology choices (Pio 2007; Nipon et al. 2017; 
UCS 2017; Marks and Paravacini 2018; Monsanto Tribunal
2016; Luna and Dowd-Uribe 2020). 
23 https://www.usaid.gov. 
24 The ECID was done under the auspices of the regional govern-
ment of Sikasso (Regional Assembly—AR). It was a policy space 
opened up from above, and as such the ECID was seen to be legiti-
mate and trustworthy by most actors. 
Creating safe spaces 
The ECID was conceived as a safe space for communicative 
action (Habermas, 1981) in which refection and co-opera-
tive action could be carried out by individuals on the basis
of deliberation and argumentation in a carefully thought-out 
environment of mutual support and empathy. Within these
spaces, people who might feel threatened or vulnerable by
sharing their knowledge and experience could gain conf-
dence, analyse, question, organise and act. 
However, the possibility that patriarchal relations, hier-
archy and self-censorship might constrain deliberation and
inclusion was a genuine concern for the organisers of the
ECID. A common observation in many participatory pro-
cesses, especially those undertaken where there are pro-
nounced social hierarchies, is that men and wealthier indi-
viduals are generally far less inhibited about contributing
to debates than women and poorer people (Hill Collins and
Bilge 2020). With a relatively large group of 45 farmer-
jurors there was also a risk that more introverted, quieter or
less confdent individuals might be marginalised and even
excluded from discussions. 
These risks were minimised by setting up the separate and
smaller commissions based on farm size and gender (Table 1
and Box 1). This safeguard created protective spaces that
reduced possible intersectional and gender discrimination. 
It is noteworthy that about 20% of the male farmer-jurors
were initially not comfortable with the participation of
women. At the start of the ECID, some men were heard
saying “This is not the place for women’’ (Mamadou)25 and
“Women cannot sensibly discuss technical issues like GM
science and its benefts” (Abdoul). The all-women com-
mission allowed women—who were mostly small marginal
farmers (Table 1)—to freely express their own views without
being subjected to gender discrimination and male chau-
vinism. By the end of the ECID, the women farmers not
only generated their own recommendations (Box 1), they
also gained the respect of the initially prejudiced men. On
the last day the men noted: “We are proud of our women.
They debated so well and had many good ideas” (Mamadou
and Abdoul). “Their recommendations are so bold and very
relevant for the future of family farming in Mali” (Ibrahim
and Mohammed). 
These safe spaces for male and female producers helped
resolve diferences among farmer-jurors as well as co-ordi-
nate diverse interests within and between commissions. By
embracing these politics of diference, the ECID of Sikasso
thus respected the dignity and the agency of diferently posi-
tioned farmer-jurors by “giving political representation to
25 Farmer-jurors are identifed only by their frst name to respect their 
privacy and the confdentiality of the information made public. 







































































   
 
group interests and celebrating the distinctive cultures and
characteristics of diferent groups” (Young 1986, p. 22). 
The four commissions co-existed and functioned as
relatively independent and parallel citizens’ juries within
the ECID. In their palavers, each commission was able to
develop its own ground rules (e.g. no interrupting, giving
every participant equal opportunities to speak, etc.) with the 
help of their facilitator. While this led to some diferences
in the way that the diferent arguments and recommenda-
tions were formulated in each commission, it was felt this
approach was necessary to ensure a genuinely participatory
process. It also added a further empowering dimension to
the ECID by facilitating a diversity of approaches in each
commission that allowed for a wide range of viewpoints
and arguments to be expressed. The diferent commissions
thus ofered a safe space that allowed farmers “to explore
their intersubjectivity and construct shared meanings that
made sense to them” (Jean Luc Virchaux, Oversight Panel
member). 
A further indication of the quality of these safe spaces
was the extent to which the farmer-jurors were allowed to
interrogate their sources of information, rather than simply
being passive recipients of specialist testimonies. The pro-
portion of time that was devoted to the presentation of wit-
ness evidence versus the amount of time allowed for inter-
rogating witnesses was roughly equal (50 min). According
to the Oversight Panel, this appeared to be enough for the
jurors to become sufciently informed about the issues on
which witnesses gave evidence. This compares favourably
with other similar processes (Pimbert and Wakeford 2001, 
2003). The length of this interrogation period also allowed
jurors to draw on their own experience to challenge the
‘facts’ and arguments made by the specialist witnesses. 
Moreover, farmer jurors had another opportunity to
directly interview witnesses by recalling them to give more
evidence in the safe space of their respective commissions.
A total of 7 specialist witnesses were invited by the diferent
commissions to give more detailed information and clarif-
cations. For example, Dr Siaka Dembele was invited by the
medium and large producer commissions to clarify what his
research institute had agreed with Syngenta and Monsanto
about the use of Bt genes in cotton in Mali. During this
exchange with Dr Dembelé, farmers learnt that Mali, as a
low income country, did not have adequate lab equipment
and facilities to ensure proper biosafety for GM research.
Further discussions between Mr T. Buthelezi and the com-
mission of small-scale producers revealed that Bt cotton seed
is three times more expensive than hybrid cotton seed in
South Africa. All commissions re-invited the Indian farmer
witnesses for more details on how insect pest attacks had led
to the failure of Bt cotton cultivation and subsequent farm
bankruptcies in parts of Andhra Pradesh (AP). As members
of the Community Media Trust, both women farmers had
made two flms on the impacts of Bt cotton on farmers lives
in Warangal district (AP). The commissions learnt about the
many farmer suicides and human tragedies associated with
Bt cotton failures in Warangal district where close to 1 mil-
lion people live.26 Finally, the women’s commission called
back Dr Hama Garba to ask him how women could become
more involved in farmer feld schools and agroecological
approaches to control pests. The ECID allowed the farmer-
jurors to not only scrutinise the evidence. It also provided
them with opportunities to challenge the manner in which
witnesses had framed the issues. 
Compared with the farmer-jurors, most specialist wit-
nesses were wealthier, better educated, often urban-based,
and represented powerful organisations. Despite these une-
qual power relations and asymmetrical relationships, inter-
actions between specialist witnesses and the jurors were
mutually respectful. However, inequalities did surface in
a few instances. At times the farmer-jurors reported feel-
ing undermined by what some specialist witnesses said or
implied. When the Director of the Agricultural Production
programme of Burkina Faso argued that people should not
worry about pesticide poisoning because their bodies can
adapt to and neutralise toxic pesticides, the farmer-jurors
could tell this was fake science. Nevertheless, several men
and women holding babies in their arms were distressed and
momentarily destabilised by the arrogance and callousness
of this specialist witness.27 Power relationships between
insensitive technocratic witnesses and farmer-jurors were
played out during some of the ECID’s hearings. 
Overall however, the relationships were sufciently ena-
bling and non-hierarchical for farmer-jurors to participate
meaningfully in debates on GMOs and the future of farming
26 A citizen-led study carried out over a period of three years chron-
icles the fraudulent promises of the industry and the impacts of Bt 
cotton in Warangal in Andhra Pradesh (AP). This three-year study of 
Bt cotton was initiated by the AP Coalition in Defence of Diversity 
and the Deccan Development Society. The study, Bt Cotton in Andhra 
Pradesh: A Three Year Assessment, was published in 2005. The 
flm made by the two Indian women farmers— Bt Cotton in Andhra 
Pradesh: A three year fraud—was part of the study and captured the 
more qualitative dimensions of the crisis experienced by farmers. 
The flm brings alive the voices and images of farmers who tried to 
grow Bt cotton—stories of terrible loss, pain, and anger, leading to 
violence and even death. The second flm made by the Indian women 
farmers involved in the ECID’s hearings was called Why are  Waran-
gal farmers angry with  Bt Cotton? This flm also shows how after 
its introduction in 2002 in Warangal District, Bt cotton brought in 
its wake misery, destruction and death, particularly among small and 
marginal farming families (see flms in Community Media Trust et al 
2008). During the ECID’s hearings, the Indian women farmers only 
spoke about the context they knew of in AP. They were careful not 
to extrapolate their fndings from Warangal (AP) to the rest of India 
where farmer suicides are high but sometimes contested and unevenly 
spread across Bt cotton growing States (Flachs 2019). 
27 See for example footage from the video flm Senekelaw Ka Kuma. 
Paroles de Paysans—from 43.40 to 44.16  min. https://youtu.be/-

























































           
 
 





in Mali. In his report written at the end of the hearings, the
Chair of the Oversight Panel noted: 
“Conflicting views were expressed in a way that
respected diferences of opinion or position. Partici-
pants formed an opinion and came away with the abil-
ity to make a judgement about public policy”. Ous-
mane Sy 
Refections on the views of farmer‑jurors 
The African palaver tradition was at the heart of the farmers’
deliberations, giving the ECID of Sikasso its unique charac-
ter, rhythm, and dialogical quality. As a participatory, inclu-
sive, and open-ended process that took into consideration
each person’s contribution, the ECID palavers embraced an
integrated perspective which focussed on the whole situa-
tion, in all of its aspects. 
Without exception, all four commissions were opposed
to the introduction and cultivation of GM cotton in Mali
(Box 1). However, the recommendations made by each com-
mission were diverse and nuanced, refecting diferent pri-
mary reasons for rejecting GMOs. 
Large-scale farmers strongly emphasised ethical and
equity concerns in their recommendations (Box 1, Com-
mission A). They pointed to how divisive new GM seeds
would be in their villages as poorer farmers would not be
able to buy them. Whilst deliberating, members of this com-
mission voiced real concerns about impacts on social peace
and livelihoods: 
“If I have a GM cotton feld and my neighbour doesn’t,
contamination problems are bound to create confict
between us." Abdul. 
“What’s the point of encouraging us to increase cotton 
yields with GMOs when we can’t get a decent price for
what we already produce?” Kone. 
Medium and small-scale farmers were unanimous in
strongly recommending greater farmer control over agri-
cultural research. They particularly emphasised the need
for producers to be involved in every stage of the research
process. Many observers in the ECID were surprised by the
family-farmers’ sophisticated understanding of the pivotal
role of agricultural research in developing (or not) GM
technologies. Farmers called for more democratic control
over research to ensure that it meets the needs identifed
by family farmers (Box 1, Commissions B, C and D). In
many ways their recommendations anticipated today’s cur-
rent debates on the need to democratise food and agricul-
tural research (Pimbert 2018b; www.excludedvoices.org) to 
develop appropriate innovations for family farming (FAO
and IFAD 2019). 
The recommendations of the all-women commission
emphasised the need to preserve local seed varieties and
traditional know-how. It is noteworthy that the women fam-
ily-farmers framed issues and recommendations in a more
holistic way, emphasising the multiple functions and benefts
of agriculture. After the women’s commission had recalled
the specialist witness from South Africa (Mr Buthelezi) for
further questioning, a member said: 
“If a producer tells me he is earning a lot by growing
GM cotton, I am happy for him. But as far as I am
concerned, I cannot ignore the consequences of GMOs
on the soil and the environment. I do not just want to
make money. I want to look after my own and my fam-
ily’s health, as well as the health of my country and
even the whole world”. Alimata.28 
The recommendations made by the women’s commission
also identifed alternatives to GM technology, including
local seeds, greater support for organic cotton and sesame
cultivation, and women training in agroecology through
farmer feld schools (Box 1). 
Throughout the ECID, the women family-farmers articu-
lated and brought together concerns about preserving the
environment and the renewal of life, properly rewarding their
contributions to farm labour, and recognising the importance
of their reproductive labour in family farming. Women farm-
ers were, in some cases, more outspoken than male farmers
about taking radical action to defend life: 
"We don’t want GMOs, ever”, said Lidigoita, "and we
are calling upon the government to prevent them enter-
ing the country. If farmers grow them illegally, we’ll
set fre to their felds." 
This view was expressed by one member of the women’s
commission after hearing witness evidence from Indian
women farmers on high suicide rates associated with Bt
cotton cultivation in Andhra Pradesh.29 Members of the
women’s commission accepted this as a legitimate recom-
mendation but viewed GM crop destruction as only one
possible tactic among their proposals to protect people and
the land. Unlike GM protests in countries where citizens
feel their government has left them no choice but to destroy
transgenic crops,30 the farmer-jurors understood that the
28 See footage from the video flm Senekelaw Ka Kuma. Paroles de 
Paysans—from 17.15 to 18.00  min. https://youtu.be/-4E2LGNneBQ
Accessed 15 October 2020. 
29 See footnote 26. 
30 Specialist witness Guy Kastler described how GM protests and 
crop destruction in France was a direct citizens’ response to top down 
government decisions to accelerate uptake of GMOs in industrial 
food and farming. See footage from the video flm Senekelaw Ka 
Kuma. Paroles de Paysans—from 39.17 to 40.10 min. https://youtu.
be/-4E2LGNneBQ. Accessed 5 March 2021. 






















































    
 
Malian context was diferent and more fuid. Moreover, as
the women further discussed and critically refected on the
pros and cons of burning GM crops, they made it clear that
this threat was a persuasive device necessary to get the atten-
tion of the Malian government. For the women’s commis-
sion, this rhetorical threat was part of an experience-based
communication strategy aimed at insensitive bureaucrats
and decision-makers who usually need to be pushed out of
their comfort zone to listen to women farmers. Taken as a
whole however, the women’s commission was overwhelm-
ingly committed to non-violence and the protection of life. 
By afrming the defence of life and a regenerative agency,
the women’s recommendations refect what Ariel Salleh has 
described as an’embodied materialist epistemology’ (Salleh
2009) based on the day to day experience of negotiating
humanity-nature relations. Throughout their deliberations,
the women were indeed keen to ft the economic activity of
farming inside a sustainable ecological framework whilst
ensuring that their own reproductive labour and the use val-
ues they generate are fully recognised. 
Notably, the ECID allowed farmer-jurors to grasp impor-
tant underlying principles that are fundamental for the per-
formance of GM crops in diferent environments. Deep
insights were gained when a specialist witness described
research showing how unstable genetically modifed pota-
toes can be when grown in diferent conditions. For example,
in temperature stressed environments the same transgenic
potato variety produced its tubers above ground (‘in the air’)
rather than in the soil.31 During their palavers and delibera-
tions, farmers concluded that the characteristics of GM crops
are likely to be unstable and—crucially—that scientists
cannot really predict how GM crops will behave over time
and space.32 This new awareness heightened their concerns
that GM cotton oil might be altered and unsafe for human
consumption. In their palavers, several farmers opined and
anticipated that GM cotton would run into problems because
31 Dr Pia Malnoe described her experiments on transgenic potatoes 
in Switzerland, highlighting how gene-environment interactions 
caused GM potatoes to have unintended and abnormal growth pat-
terns. See footage from the video flm Senekelaw Ka Kuma. Paroles 
de Paysans—from 18.17 to 19.15  min. https://youtu.be/-4E2LG
NneBQ. Accessed 15 October 2020. 
32 Recent scientifc research shows that most traits of agricultural 
importance are multigenic and highly responsive to the environment, 
with change occurring rapidly in time and across diferent environ-
ments (Heinemann, 2020). Due to the imprecise nature of genetic 
engineering techniques, GM crops have met with an array of unin-
tended adverse efects, including widespread mutations, altered nutri-
tional profles, and agronomic problems such as stunted growth or 
environmental disturbance of traits. Unintended changes that alter the 
expression of genes and afect a plant’s metabolism and phenotype 
may have harmless or adverse impacts on human health or the envi-
ronment, depending on the change(s) introduced (Eckerstorfer et  al. 
2019). 
of unintended changes in the genetically engineered crop.
This did indeed eventually happen in neighbouring Bur-
kina Faso where, contrary to all expectations, the inferior
lint quality of GM cotton led the government to completely
phase out the cultivation of GM cotton in 2016. Major eco-
nomic losses were incurred because Bt cotton had a lower
ginning ratio and shorter fbre length than conventional
Burkinabe cotton varieties (Dowd-Uribe and Schnurr 2016; 
Luna and Dowd-Uribe 2020). 
Overall, the diferent perspectives of men and women
farmers afrmed their right to food sovereignty. One of their
primary concerns was to prevent dependence on multina-
tional seed corporations and to protect local economies from
dumping. As Brahim put it: "We want to be the masters of
our own felds, not slaves." 
Men and women farmers agreed with Amadou when he
said: "GMOs will make us dependent on foreign corpora-
tions and this will cause despair. A farmer without hope is
lost and helpless”. 
Concerns about the deeper cultural and social implica-
tions of large-scale use of GMOs were uppermost in dis-
cussions during the ECID of Sikasso. For example, farmer-
jurors used with some anxiety and disquiet the Bambara
expression for GMOs: Bayere ma’shi ("transformed
mother"). In a country like Mali, where animism remains
alive beneath a veneer of Islam, genetic engineering—trans-
ferring genes from one species to another—is alarming and
not compatible with widely held spiritual beliefs. 
Similarly, GMOs were deemed an important threat to a
co-operative way of life in Malian villages: “Our farmers are
used to helping each other. The danger is that GMOs will
destroy that sense of friendship and solidarity. It will be the
end of mutual aid and compassion, and there will therefore
be no more humanity in our villages”. Birama. 
Anger was expressed by some farmer-jurors when think-
ing about the kind of society their children would have to
live in: “If the government forces us to grow GMOs, why
should we not rebel against its decision? If we do not fght
now what kind of future will our children have? This is the
boubou33 of slavery which is being crafted to put around the 
necks of our children”. Alihou. 


































































As the chair of the Oversight Panel said in his fnal refec-
tions on the ECID of Sikasso: 
“This is not about simply deciding if we are for or
against GMOs. Instead, the centrally important issue
is to understand what kind of society is behind GMOs,
and what are the future implications of this societal
choice”. Ousmane Sy. 
The dominance of the scientific knowledge supporting
industrial farming was thus challenged in the safe space
created by the ECID. The latter enabled the articulation of
farmer knowledge and alternative subaltern perspectives
which broadened the debate. Through their palaver style
deliberations, the farmer jurors had the capacity and freedom
to shape “the boundaries that defne for them the feld of
what is possible” (Hayward 1998, p. 12). 
The holistic quality of the producers’ analysis is particu-
larly noteworthy. Farmers not only located their assessments
of GM cotton within their overall place-based livelihood
context. They also showed a clear understanding of how cul-
tural and economic processes might intersect in a dynamic
of agrarian change driven by the adoption of GM cotton.
For example, farmers’ concerns about cultural and spiritual
change induced by the adoption of GM seeds as Bayere
ma’shi ("transformed mother") intersected with economic
concerns about the high cost of GM seeds and growing
inequities in their villages. This transdisciplinary analytical
framing compares well with the more reductionist frame-
works of many conventional researchers (Pimbert 2018b). 
As Luna points out in her work on GM cotton adoption in
Burkina Faso “few scholars have explicitly explored how
economic and cultural processes intersect within processes
of agrarian change to drive technology adoption” (Luna
2020, p. 450). 
Impacts on policy 
The outcomes of the ECID were widely reported by national
and international media as soon as the farmer-jurors pre-
sented their recommendations to the Regional Assembly
of Sikasso in a public event on 29th January 2006. In the
months that followed, we worked with the Steering Com-
mittee to facilitate an action research process that led to a
series of national policy dialogues to share and discuss the
ECID’s recommendations (Online Appendix, Box A). High-
profle events took place in the capital city of Bamako in
May–July 2006: 
• Policy dialogue with the High Council of Regional
Governments of Mali (Haut Conseil des Collectivités
Locales)—held at the request of the President of the
Regional Assembly of Sikasso to discuss all the ECID’s
recommendations. 
• Public workshop to discuss the ECID’s policy recom-
mendations on GM cotton and the future of farming in
Mali. Four farmer-jurors mandated by their peers pre-
sented and defended the ECID’s recommendations in an
assembly of over two hundred people, including govern-
ment ofcials, civil society, peasant organisations, aca-
demia, international donors, and media. 
Both events were widely reported in the media and this
undoubtedly further enhanced the ECID’s societal impact.
Widespread concerns expressed by farmer organisations and
other Malian citizens’ prompted a three-hour debate in the
National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale du Mali) on all
of the ECID’s policy recommendations, with deputies ques-
tioning the Minister of Agriculture on GMOs and research
priorities.34 
The ECID caused the Malian government to indefnitely
delay the approval of legislation that needed to be in place
before GM crops can be introduced in the feld. An external
impact assessment35 showed that actors with major vested
interests in GM technology were destabilised and frustrated
by the ECID’s recommendations (Bryant 2009). The coor-
dinator of International Biosafety in the Ministry of Envi-
ronment lamented: “Everyone is pointing at this Citizens’
Jury in Sikasso…. The impact (of l’ECID) has been very
negative… Here (in Mali) things are stalling because of the
misinformation made worse by the jury” (Bryant 2009). 
Specialist witness Dr Dembelé as well as public and private
sector scientists involved in GM research were also frus-
trated with this policy outcome, and they cast doubt on the
judgment of the farmer-jurors. They did this in a manner
that was consistent with how several scientists reacted to
participatory risk assessments and public criticism of GMOs
in Europe (Baumann and Pimbert 1998; Joly and Rip 2007; 
Levidow and Carr 2009). As scientists they questioned— 
post-ECID—the legitimacy of this participatory process in
34 The debate in the National Assembly took place on 1st June 2006 
at the request of the deputy Mr. Aboubacar Touré, the elected dep-
uty from Niono and member of the National Commission on Rural 
Development and the Environment. 
35 This independent external assessment was done by Peter Bryant 
with the permission of the ECID’s Executive Committee. Although 
his visit to Mali was of relatively short duration, Bryant was able 
to capitalize on all the previous work done by the organisers of the 
ECID. He conducted interviews with key stakeholders over a month 
period in June-July 2006. Bryant’s independent impact assessment 
supports our own fndings and vice versa. 







   
 
 

























































   
  
relation to standard positivist forms of knowledge produc-
tion and validation—a pattern commonly observed else-
where (Ancori 2012). Our interviews with scientists also
revealed a strong belief that “it is unthinkable that actors
other than researchers should have the legitimacy to ask the
right questions” (Kuhn et al. 1990, p. 24). More generally, it
was apparent that the idea co-producing post-normal knowl-
edge for democratic policy-making was a “nightmare for the
scientifc community” (Graur 2007, p. 1156). 
Commenting in the UK’s Independent, the West Africa
regulatory manager for Monsanto said: "We cannot go into
a country unless there are clear biotech regulations, cover-
ing matters of biosafety, and of how trials should be con-
ducted and presented. Mali has none of these" (Selva 2006). 
The impact of the ECID was such that Monsanto radically
changed its strategy: it decided to exit from Mali to consoli-
date its research and its investment eforts in neighbouring
Burkina Faso. Researchers in Burkina Faso and Monsanto
had indeed been working together before 2006, and the
frst feld trials of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso were done in
2003 (Luna and Dowd-Uribe 2020). With the enactment of
Burkina Faso’s biosafety law in 2006, the policy environ-
ment became more enabling for GM cotton research and
cultivation. 
Thanks to the ECID, peasant organisations realised how
much biosafety regulatory systems are a key determinant
for the introduction and deployment of genetically modifed
organisms. It is noteworthy that a newly formed Government
of Mali signed a National Biotechnology Security Law on
December 1, 2008.36 However, lack of implementation regu-
lations for this Biotechnology Security Law has continued
to signifcantly constrain and limit agricultural research on
GMOs in Mali. Most notably, the roll out of such national
‘implementation legislation’ has been systematically blocked
by Malian members of La Via Campesina and social move-
ments in West Africa. Emboldened by the outcomes of the
ECID of Sikasso, the CNOP has actively mobilised farm-
ers in the countryside against the introduction of GM crops
in Mali, and continues to thwart the introduction of imple-
mentation regulations today (INFOGM 2008; CNOP 2020). 
Peasant organisations have thus greatly hampered the intro-
duction of functional legislation for GM crops in Mali, and
this has led to the “development of highly precautionary leg-
islation …. and a cautious approach to adoption of GMOs”
(Wafula et al. 2012, p. 76). 
Law n°08–042/AN—RM, 1 December 2008. Loi Relative à 
la Sécurité en Biotechnologie en République du Mali, Assemblée 
Nationale. Republic of Mali. 
Learning to do better next time 
We do not claim that the ECID was a fawless process. With
the beneft of hindsight, we would particularly want to avoid
two problems in future mini-publics on politically sensitive
topics: 
Undermining subaltern voices 
Several high-profle fgures in global social movements
intervened to discredit and stop the ECID 48 h before its
opening ceremony in Sikasso. A group of radical intel-
lectuals and international peasant leaders who had just
gathered in Bamako for the January 2006 World Social
Forum were convinced that the ECID was controlled by
Syngenta. These actors openly claimed that the organisers
were in favour of GM technology and had close links with
the corporate seed industry. They asked all invited special-
ist witnesses from civil society to sabotage37 and boycott
the ECID. We were deeply destabilised when told that a
delegation of well-known alter-globalisation activists and
French peasant leaders would travel to Sikasso to denounce
the ECID as a manipulative pro-industry event during the
opening press conference. Nine months of preparatory work 
for the ECID were about to be jeopardised, in a highly public
way. Through intense dialogues—and with the supportive
intervention of civil society and peasant leaders38 from La 
Via Campesina—this act of sabotage was prevented only
a few hours before the opening ceremony. We realise now
that this dramatic situation could have been avoided had we
made more eforts early on to reassure potential detractors
about the independence of the ECID. This observation is
also valid for pro-GM actors: with more trust-building and
reassurances Monsanto, Syngenta Foundation, DAGRIS
and USAID might have agreed to participate in the ECID’s
hearings. 
However, this episode also highlighted the unwillingness
of emblematic leaders and organisations to trust ‘ordinary’
farmers to make sensible decisions about politically sensi-
tive issues. Our interviews show that some peasant lead-
ers feared that the ECID’s farmer-jurors would come out in
favour of GM cotton because they do not really understand
the complexities involved. They essentially viewed farmers
as having a knowledge defcit which needed to be flled with
37 The word ‘sabotage’ was brandished by the international actors 
intent on disrupting the ECID of Sikasso. We have therefore chosen 
to use this word here because it accurately describes the destabilising 
threat we were faced with. 
38 Members of La Via Campesina who participated in the ECID, 
including the specialist witness Guy Kastler from the Réseau 
Semences Paysannes and the Confédération Paysanne in France, 













































































expert knowledge—in this case by their own knowledge as
peasant leaders. This bias against peoples’ knowledge and
their capacity to decide for themselves through reasoned
debate is commonplace and widespread among ‘experts’ and
individuals in positions of authority (Dryzek 2010; Testart
2015). 
Evidence suggests that changing this elitist and patron-
ising mind-set can, in some cases, be encouraged through
awareness raising and experiential education targeted at
individuals invited to participate in future mini-publics. For
example when we asked if he had learnt anything from his
involvement in the ECID, a leader of a farmer organisation
and specialist witness stated: “One thing I discovered was
that before going I thought I knew everything in the rural
world because I am an intellectual and a farmer; but I real-
ised that the truth is with the people who deal with farming.
It has been a humbling truth—I learnt a lot from this process
and I realised I didn’t know anything. The people who know
are the farmers and they’ve never been to school”. 
Lack of specialist witnesses with gendered 
perspectives on GMOs 
Four out of fourteen specialist witnesses were women—two
Indian farmers and two internationally known scientists
whose distinct perspectives enriched the ECID’s delibera-
tions (Online Appendix, Box E). However, we were unable
to invite specialist witnesses who could speak about the
gendered impacts of GM crops on social relations, house-
hold nutrition, and the work load of women farmers. The
widespread institutional discrimination that marginalises
gender studies and prevents many women from making a
career in universities and research institutes (Goetz 1997; 
Winchester and Browning 2015; De Angelis and Grüning
2020) limited our options to invite suitable witnesses. Invit-
ing more women scholars to give gendered evidence should
nevertheless be a priority in future mini-publics on GM
crops in West Africa—especially because recent research
in Burkina Faso has shown that gendered labour dynamics
and decision-making are afected by GM cotton cultivation
(Luna 2020). 
Conclusion 
This paper has ofered critical refections on the method-
ology, process, and immediate outcomes of the Citizen
Space for Democratic Deliberation (ECID) on GMOs and
the future of farming in Mali. This unprecedented event in
West Africa successfully mobilised a large number of farm-
ers and other citizens in a bottom-up participatory process
that clearly had an impact on policy and practice. The ECID 
helped politicise an issue of global importance and allowed
marginalised voices to question the dominant discourse in
favour of GM crops and the industrialisation of agriculture.
As an experiment in deliberative democracy and action
research, the ECID also helped to shift the focus of qual-
ity and validity from “a concern with idealist questions in
search of truth to concern for engagement, dialogue, prag-
matic outcomes, and an emergent refexive sense of what is
important” (Bradbury and Reason 2001, p. 343). 
The African palaver model of social interaction and
consensus-building (Hampate Ba 1985; Diangitukwa 2014) 
was given a new political legitimacy in the context of the
ECID of Sikasso. Rooted in traditional Black African demo-
cratic practice, the ECID palavers and deliberations helped
mediate a respectful dialogue between diferent knowledge
systems and a search for the common good. This power-
equalizing process was grounded in an emancipatory ethos
and practice that fostered the creation of valuable knowledge
by afrming the right to cognitive justice: “the constitutional
right of diferent systems of knowledge to exist as part of a
dialogue and debate” (Visvanathan 2005, p. 92). As such,
this unique deliberative process helped change the tradi-
tional role of passive citizens to that of “builders of collec-
tive community knowledge and generators of policy change”
(Evans-Agnew and Eberhardt 2019, p. 358). Moreover, this
frst ECID palaver is internationally signifcant because it de
facto questions the unconscious racist biases (Tate and Page
2018) responsible for the relative absence of Black African
mini-publics in contemporary practice and academic writing
on deliberative democracy (Diangitukwa 2014). 
As a safe space for communication and action, the ECID
of Sikasso allowed farmer-citizens “to criticize power or
withhold consent” (Chambers 2010, p. 896). The independ-
ent oversight panel concluded that legitimate decision-mak-
ing was derived through consensus after public deliberation
and respectful inclusion in the fair setting of the ECID, and
without any coercive infuences. However, from the per-
spective of deliberative democratic theory (Dryzek, 1990; 
Smith 2009; Parkinson and Mansbridge 2014; Bächtiger
et al. 2017; Lafont 2019), we do not claim that the ECID
was an ‘ideal speech situation’ (sensu Habermas 1996). Fol-
lowing Dryzek (1990) and Rostbøll (2009), we recognize
that Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’ can never be fully
realized in practice. Rather than a perfect blueprint it is an
imagined ideal that fundamentally “entails the inclusive and 
egalitarian dimension” of deliberative democracy (Rostbøll
2009, p. 21). 
As a bottom-up participatory process, the ECID of
Sikasso ofers important insights on how to reverse the cur-
rent democratic defcit in policy-making and risk assess-
ments. Decisions about GM technology in the context of
food, farming, and the environment require meaningful
inclusive communication and engagement with, for, and by
actors directly afected by these policy choices. This calls



































































    
 
for methodological and institutional innovations which focus
on enabling the early and ongoing engagement of diferent
actors potentially afected by the policy decisions. It also
requires robust safeguards to ensure that the debate is not
just done on science’s terms or framed by powerful actors
with vested interests in GM seeds and new gene-drive tech-
nologies (Montenegro de Wit 2020; Wirz et al. 2020). In a
context of uncertainty where genetic engineering is deeply
contested, the ECID represents an internationally relevant
transdisciplinary space where farmer and citizen knowl-
edges can engage in safe conversations with the expertise of
natural and social scientists to generate post-normal (sensu
Ravetz 2006) forms of collective intelligence for policy mak-
ing. When they do enable a deliberative democratic political
culture—rather than just focus on supposedly “ideal deliber-
ative designs” (Böker 2017, p. 18)—ECIDs can indeed gen-
erate informed citizen-led critique and proposals that break
from any “heteronomously predetermined role” (Chambers
2013, p. 147). ECIDs and similar mini-publics can thus help
disrupt authoritative decision-making and discourses on
genetically engineered technologies, corporate control, and
the broader project of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in
food and agriculture (WEF 2018; Ndung’u and Signé 2020; 
Canfeld et al. 2021). 
Many people in West Africa say that the methodology
and participatory policy process enabled by the ECID of
Sikasso continue to have an enduring impact and relevance
today—15 years later. For example in 2010, the ECID pro-
cess was emulated in large-scale citizens’ deliberations on
the governance of agricultural research in West Africa (Pim-
bert et al. 2011). This West African process evolved into
what Hendriks (2006) has called an “integrated delibera-
tive system”. The ECID of Sikasso together with two other
interdependent ECIDs and a high-level policy dialogue with
AGRA (IIED et al. 2012) were embedded in long-term and
iterative PAR cycles in which there were multi-dimensional
and multi-directional relationships with other actors in soci-
ety as well as relationships with governments—from local
to global. Actors who would not normally engage with each
other interacted in new ways, and repeatedly. Cumulatively,
this multi-actor deliberative process generated a political
culture and impacts at local, national, regional, and interna-
tional levels. Just in 2019, farmer and citizen groups identi-
fed the ECID methodology and its political culture as the
best means of facilitating a public debate on the risks and
benefts of Target Malaria’s39 plans to introduce genetically
Target Malaria is a research consortium that aims to develop and 
share new genetic technologies to modify mosquitoes and reduce 
malaria transmission. The consortium plans to release genetically 
male sterile mosquitoes in parts of Africa, including Burkina Faso 
and Mali. Target Malaria receives core funding from the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation and from the Open Philanthropy Project 
Fund. See https://targetmalaria.org. Accessed 24 January 2020. 
male sterile mosquitoes to combat malaria in Burkina Faso
and Mali. Last but not least, several Malian peasant leaders40 
have recently acknowledged the decisive positive impacts
which the ECID of Sikasso has had on the self-pride of peas-
ant farmers and on the determination of their organisations
to struggle for agroecology and food sovereignty. This col-
lective resolve of peasant organisations partly explains why
AGRA has been unable to infuence agricultural policies in
Mali as much as it has in other parts of Africa (Goita 2020; 
Wise 2020). The ECID continues to motivate farmer-led
eforts to claim peoples’ sovereign right to defne their own
food and agricultural policies in Mali. 
We close with this view of the Chair of the Oversight
Panel: 
“Until now, debates on major policy choices in Mali
have been instigated and led by the State. In this sense,
the ECID is a frst. The fact that it was the Sikasso
Regional Assembly and producer organisations that
took the initiative bodes well for the future. The suc-
cess of the exercise proves that decentralised com-
munities and producers are capable of contributing to
public policy decisions”. Ousmane Sy. 
Supplementary Information The online version contains supplemen-
tary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-021-10221-1. 
Acknowledgements Our sincerest gratitude goes to the farmers and
other individuals who have shared their stories with us. We also thank
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Afairs (DGIS) and the Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation (SDC) for funding this action research.
We thank fve anonymous AHUM reviewers for their very helpful com-
ments and suggestions. 
Declarations
Conflict of interest The authors declare no confict of interest. 
Consent to participate Interviewees and participants of the ECID gave
their free prior informed consent before participating in the study. 
Consent for publication Farmer participants agreed to the anonymous
publication of their comments (they are identifed by their frst name to
respect their privacy in this article). Other interviewees and participants
made their statements freely available in writing and audio recordings. 
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-
bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta-
tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long
as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes
were made. The images or other third party material in this article are
included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated
40 For example, Ibrahima Coulibaly who is President of ROPPA (the 
Network of Peasant Organisations and Agricultural Producers in West 















      













           
       
        
 
 
       
 
       
















     
           
        
 
        









       






        
 
       
 
 





      
 
        
 
 
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in
the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not
permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will
need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a
copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. 
References 
Aasen, M., and A. Vatn. 2013. Deliberation on GMOs: A study of
how a citizens’ jury afects the citizens’ attitudes. Environmental
Values 22 (4): 461–481.
Agrilinks. 2020. The fourth industrial revolution and its potential
applications in agriculture in Africa. https://www.agrilinks.org/
post/fourth-industrial-revolution-and-its-potential-applications-
agriculture-africa. Accessed 2 September 2020.
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA). 2020. AGRA in
2019: Transforming African agriculture through partnerships. 
Nairobi: Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA).
Ancori, B. 2012. La production et la circulation des connaissances sci-
entifques et des savoirs profanes dans nos sociétés techniciennes.
In: Darbellay F (ed.) La circulation des savoirs: Interdiscipli-
narité, concepts nomades, analogies, métaphores. Bern: Editions
Internationales Peter Lang.
ARdS (Assemblée Régionale de Sikasso). 2005. OGM et débat cit-
oyen. Policy dialogue on 27 et 28 June 2005. Ministère de
l’Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales, Assem-
blée Régionale de Sikasso, Mali.
ARdS (Assemblée Régionale de Sikasso). 2006. Rapport général.
Espace Citoyen d’Interpellation Démocratique (ECID) sue les
Organismes Génétiquement Modifés (OGM) en relation avec
l’avenir de l’agriculture au Mali. Ministère de l’Administration
Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales, Assemblée Régionale
de Sikasso, Mali. 
Bächtiger, A., J.S. Dryzek, J.J. Mansbridge, and M. Warren. 2017.
Oxford handbook of deliberative democracy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Baumann, M. and M.P. Pimbert. 1998. The people versus the life indus-
try. Seedling (March), GRAIN. https://www.grain.org/en/article/
294-the-people-versus-the-life-industry. Accessed 23 February
2021. 
Benessia, A., S. Funtowicz, M. Giampietro, Â. Guimaraẽs Pereira, J.
Ravetz, A. Saltelli, R. Strand and J.P. van der Sluijs. 2016. The
rightful place of science: Science on the verge. Tempe, AZ: Con-
sortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes.
Bhambra, G. 2014a. Introduction: Knowledge production in global con-
text: Power and coloniality. Current Sociology 62 (4): 451–456.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392114524504. 
Bhambra, G.K. 2014b. Postcolonial and decolonial dialogues. Post-
colonial Studies 17 (2): 115–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/13688
790.2014.966414. 
Bhattacharya, T. 2017. Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping class,
recentering oppression. London: Pluto Press. 
Böker, M. 2017. Justifcation, critique and deliberative legitimacy: The
limits of mini-publics. Contemporary Political Theory 16 (1):
19–40. 
Bradbury, H., and P. Reason. 2001. Broadening the bandwidth of valid-
ity: Issues and choice points for improving the quality of action
research. In Handbook of action research: Participative inquiry
and practice, ed. P. Reason and H. Bradbury. London: SAGE
Publishing.
Bradley, K., and H. Herrera. 2016. Decolonizing food justice: Naming,
resisting, and researching colonizing forces in the movement.
Antipode 48 (1): 97–114. https://doi.org/10.1111/anti.12165. 
Bryant, P. 2009. Deliberative governance: political fad or a vision of
empowerment? In , ed. C. Lyall, T. Papaioannou, and J. Smith.
Burlington: Ashgate.
CAGJ/AGRA Watch. 2020. The struggle over agroecology: Mapping
and mobilizing against the gates foundation’s infuence in Afri-
can agriculture. Community Alliance for Global Justice/AGRA
Watch. Webinar video and transcript at https://cagj.org/2020/08/
watch-the-agra-watch-webinar-the-struggle-over-agroecology/. 
Accessed 31 August 2020.
Canfeld, M., M.D. Anderson, and P. McMichael. 2021. UN Food Sys-
tems Summit 2021: Dismantling democracy and resetting cor-
porate control of food systems. Frontiers in Sustainable Food
Systems 5: 661552. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2021.661552. 
Campbell, D.J., and J. Crittenden. 2019. Direct deliberative democ-
racy: How citizens can rule. Montreal: Black Rose Books. 
Centre Djoliba. 2003. Actes de l’Espace Communal d’Interpellation
Democratique (ECID), Sikasso 16th-19th December 2003. Bam-
ako: Association DJOLIBA Hommes et Développement.
Chambers, S.A. 2010. Theories of political justifcation. Philosophy
Compass 5 (11): 893–903.
Chambers, S.A. 2013. The lessons of Rancière. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
CMDT. 2008. Statement of Mali at the 67th plenary meeting of the
ICAC. Ouagadougou: Republic of Mali, Ofce of the Prime
Minister. 
Community Media Trust, P.V. Satheesh and M.P. Pimbert. 2008.
Afrming Life and Diversity: Rural Images and Voices on Food
Sovereignty in South India. Reclaiming Diversity and Citizen-
ship Series. London: IIED. https://pubs.iied.org/sites/default/
fles/pdfs/migrate/14556IIED.pdf. Accessed 17 February 2021.
Cooper, M.W., and C.T. West. 2016. Unravelling the Sikasso Paradox.
Agricultural change and malnutrition in Sikasso, Mali. Ecology
of Food and Nutrition 56 (2): 1–23.
Coote, A., and J. Lenaghan. 1997. Citizens’ Juries: Theory into prac-
tice. London: IPPR. 
Cornwall, A. 2004. Introduction: New democratic spaces? The politics 
and dynamics of institutionalised participation. IDS Bulletin 35 
(2): 1–10.
Cornwall, A., and V.S. Coelho. 2006. Spaces for Change? The politics
of citizen participation in new democratic arenas. London: Zed
Books. 
Crenshaw, K. 1991. Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity
politics, and violence against women of color. Stanford Law
Review 43 (6): 1241–1299. https://doi.org/10.2307/1229039. 
De Angelis, G., and B. Grüning. 2020. Gender inequality in precarious
academic work: Female adjunct professors in Italy. Frontiers in
Sociology 4: 87. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2019.00087. 
Delannoi, G. 2019. Le Tirage au sort. Comment l’utiliser. Paris:
Presses de Sciences Po. 
de Sousa, S.B. 2008. Introduction: Opening up the canon of knowledge
and recognition of diference. In Another knowledge is possible:
Beyond northern epistemologies: Vol. Reinventing social eman-
cipation, ed. S.B. de Santos. London: Verso. 
de Sousa, S.B. 2015. Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epis-
temicide. New York: Routledge.
Diangitukwa, F. 2014. The distant origin of African Governance: The
Palaver Tree. Revue Gouvernance. https://doi.org/10.7202/10388
81ar. 
Diawara, M., M. Harvard, M. Soumare, A. Keita, A. Traore, and
B. Kone. 2019. Typology des exploitations agricoles pour
l’accompagnement des producteurs dans les zones cotonnieres
du Mali. In: Les zones cotonnières africaines: Dynamiques et
durabilité, eds S. Mamy and M. Havard, 157–172. Actes du col-
loque de Bamako, 21 au 23 Novembre 2017. Bamako. Montpel-
lier: Cirad-Agritrop. 













        
 
 
    























         
          
 
 
      
 
 













      


















Dowd-Uribe, B. 2014. Engineering yields and inequality? How insti-
tutions and agro-ecology shape Bt cotton outcomes in Burkina
Faso. Geoforum 53: 161–171. 
Dowd-Uribe, B., and M.A. Schnurr. 2016. Burkina Faso’s reversal on
genetically modifed cotton and the implications for Africa. Afri-
can Afairs 115 (458): 161–172.
Dryzek, J.S. 1990. Discursive Democracy. Politics, Policy, and Politi-
cal Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dryzek, J.S. 2000. Deliberative democracy and beyond. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, J.S. 2010. Foundations and frontiers of deliberative govern-
ance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, J.S., and A. Tucker. 2008. Deliberative innovation to difer-
ent efect: Consensus conferences in Denmark, France, and the
United States. Public Administration Review 68 (5): 864–876. 
Dussel, E. 1993. Eurocentrism and modernity. Boundary 2: an Interna-
tional Journal of Literature and Culture 20 (3): 65–76.
Eckerstorfer, M.F., M. Dolezel, A. Heissenberger, M. Miklau, W.
Reichenbecher, R.A. Steinbrecher, and F. Waßmann. 2019. An
EU perspective on biosafety considerations for plants devel-
oped by genome editing and other new genetic modifcation
techniques (nGMs). Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotech-
nology 7: 31. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2019.0003. 
Elstub, S., and O. Escobar. 2019. Handbook of democratic innova-
tion and governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Evans-Agnew, R.A., and C. Eberhardt. 2019. Uniting action research
and citizen science: Examining the opportunities for mutual
beneft between two movements through a woodsmoke photo-
voice study. Action Research 17 (3): 357–377. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1476750318798909. 
Ezeanya, C. 2011. Education and Indigenous Knowledge in Africa:
Traditional bone setting and orthopaedic medicine in West
Africa. Washington, DC: Howard University.
Fanon, F. 2021. Black Skin, White Masks. London: Penguin Modern
Classics. 
FAO. 2017. Mali Fact Sheet on Food and Agriculture Policy Trends. 
Rome: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization.
FAO and IFAD. 2019. United Nations Decade of Family Farming
2019–2028. Global Action Plan. Rome: United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization.
Federici, S. 2012. Revolution at point zero: Housework, reproduction
and feminist struggle. Oakland, CA: PM Press. 
Fine, M., J.E. Tuck, and S. Zeller-Berkman. 2007. Do you believe in
Geneva? In Handbook of critical and indigenous knowledges, 
ed. N. Denzin, L.T. Smith, and Y. Lincoln. Beverley Hills,
CA: Sage.
Fishkin, J.S. 2011. When the people speak: Deliberative democracy
and public consultation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fishkin, J.S., and J. Mansbridge. 2017. The Prospects and limits of
deliberative democracy. Dædalus, the Journal of the Ameri-
can Academy of Arts & Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1162/
DAED_x_00442. 
Flachs. A. 2019. Cultivating Knowledge. Biotechnology, Sustain-
ability, and the Human Cost of Cotton Capitalism in India.
Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
Forum pour l’Autre Mali. 2004. Fibre Africaine. Conclusions et
propositions du Forum de la Societé Civile sur le Coton au
Service de la Créativité et du Lien Social. Bamako, Mali. 
Fung, A. 2003. Recipes for public spheres: Eight institutional design
choices and their consequences. The Journal of Political Phi-
losophy 11 (3): 338–367.
Funtowicz, S.O., and J.R. Ravetz. 1993. Science for the post-normal
age. Futures 25 (7): 739–755.
Glover, D. 2010. The corporate shaping of GM crops as a technology
for the poor. The Journal of Peasant Studies 37 (1): 67–90. 
Goetz, A.M. 1997. Getting institutions right for women in develop-
ment. London: Zed Books. 
Goita, M. 2020. It’s a vicious cycle. Interview on AGRA for the Rosa
Luxemburg Foundation, Germany. https://www.rosalux.de/en/
news/id/42644?cHash=c1516e5c7957c0497a09c27027403bc2. 
Accessed 5 October 2020. 
Goodin, R.E., and J.S. Dryzek. 2006. Deliberative impacts: the
macro-political uptake of mini-publics. Politics & Society 34 
(2): 219–244.
GRAIN. 2004. Bt cotton on Mali’s doorstep. Seedling, 18 Apr
2004. GRAIN, Barcelona. 
Graur, D. 2007. Public control could be a nightmare for research-
ers. Nature 450 (1156): 20. https://doi.org/10.1038/4501156b. 
Grӧnlund, K., A. Bachtiger and M. Setälä, 2015. Deliberative mini-
publics: Involving citizens in the democratic process. ECPR
Press. 
Grosfoguel, R. 2007. The epistemic decolonial turn: Beyond politi-
cal-economy paradigms. Cultural Studies 21 (2–3): 211–223.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162514. 
Grosfoguel, R. 2011. Decolonizing post-colonial studies and paradigms
of political economy: Transmodernity, decolonial thinking, and
global coloniality. Transmodernity 1 (1): 214.
Grosfoguel, R. 2013. The structure of knowledge in Westernized uni-
versities: Epistemic racism/sexism and the four genocides/epis-
temicides of the long 16th century’. Human Architecture: Jour-
nal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 11 (1), 73–90. Online.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/humanarchitecture/vol11/iss1/8/. 
Accessed 29 October 2016. 
Habermas, J. 1981. Theory of Communicative Action. Volume one:
Reason and Rationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Habermas, J. 1996. Between facts and norms. contributions to a dis-
course theory of law and democracy. Cambridge: Polity.
Hall, B.L., and R. Tandon. 2017. Decolonization of knowledge, epis-
temicide, participatory research and higher education’. Research
for All 1 (1): 6–19. https://doi.org/10.18546/RFA.01.1.02. 
Hampaté Ba, A. 1985. Lettre à la Jeunesse Africaine. In: Lettres
ouvertes à la jeunesse—Concours Dialogue des générations.
Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique. [Accessed on 5
October 2020 at Des Lettres—https://www.deslettres.fr/damad
ou-hampate-ba-jeunesse-soyez-au-service-vie/].
Hayward, C.R. 1998. De-facing power. Polity 31 (1): 1–22.
Head, G. and T. Dennehy. 2010. Insect resistance management for
transgenic Bt cotton. In Cotton Biotechnology in Agriculture and
Forestry, 65, ed. U.B. Zehr. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-642-04796-1_7. 
Heinemann, J.A. 2020. Assessment of modern biotechnologies. In:
Transformation of our food system, ed. H. R. Herren, B. Haerlin
and the IAASTD+10 Advisory Group. Zurich: Biovision and
Foundation for Future Farming.
Hendriks, C.M. 2006. Integrated deliberation: reconciling civil soci-
ety’s dual role in deliberative democracy. Political Studies 54 
(3): 486–508.
Heyzer, N. 1986. Working women in South-east Asia. Development,
subordination and emancipation. London: Open University
Press. 
Hill Collins, P., and S. Bilge. 2020. Intersectionality. London: Polity
Press. 
Hooks, B. 2000. Feminist theory: From margin to center. London:
Pluto Press. 
Hugon, P. 2005. Les réformes de la flière coton au Mali et les négocia-
tions internationales. Afrique Contemporaine 216 (4): 203–225.
IIED, APPG on Agroecology, CNOP, Kene conseils, Centre Djoliba,
and IRPAD, 2012. High level policy dialogue between the Alli-
ance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and small-scale




   
 
 
          
  





























         
 





    





     
             
           
 
   




        
 
 
            




    
          
 
       
 
         





















           









for development in West Africa. IIED, London. https://pubs.iied.
org/G03349/. Accessed 18 February 2021.
INFOGM. 2008. Mali—L’adoption d’une loi sur les OGM mécon-
tente les organisations paysannes. INFOGM, 13 November 2008.
Paris. https://www.infogm.org/MALI-L-adoption-d-une-loi-sur-
les?lang=fr. Accessed 8 February 2021.
Involve. 2020. Methods for public participation. https://www.involve.
org.uk. Accessed 22 September 2020.
Irwin, A. 2001. Citizen engagement in science and technology policy:
A commentary on recent UK experience. Participatory Learning
and Action 40: 72–75. 
James C. 2010. Global status of commercialized biotech/GM crops.
ISAAA brief 42. Ithaca, NY: ISAAA. 
Jasanof, S. 2016. The ethics of invention: Technology and the human
future. New York: Norton. 
Jepson, P.C., M. Guzy, K. Blaustein, M. Sow, M. Sarr, P. Mineau, and
S. Kegley. 2014. Measuring pesticide ecological and health risks
in West African agriculture to establish an enabling environment
for sustainable intensifcation. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society b: Biological Sciences 369: 20130491. 
Joly, P.B., and A. Rip. 2007. A timely harvest. Nature 450: 174. https://
doi.org/10.1038/450174a. 
Kelly, R., R. Pirog, A. Guel, J. Henderson, K. Wilcox, T. Wimberg,
V. García Polanco, D. Babayode, K. Watson, and E. Nelson.
2020. An Annotated Bibliography on Structural Racism Present
in the U.S. Food System, Seventh Edition. MI: MSU Center for
Regional Food Systems (CRFS).
Kuhn T.S, M. Biezunski, P. Jacob et al. 1990. La tension essentielle.
Tradition et changement dans les sciences. Paris: Gallimard. 
Kuruganti, K., M.P. Pimbert, and T. Wakeford. 2008. The people’s
vision: UK and Indian refections on Prajateerpu. Participatory
Learning and Action 58: 11–17. 
Lafont, C. 2019. Democracy without shortcuts: A participatory con-
ception of deliberative democracy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 
Levidow, L., and S. Carr. 2009. GM food on trial: testing European
DEMOCRACY. London: Routledge.
Levidow, L. 2008. Democratizing technology choices: European pub-
lic participation in agbiotech assessments. Gatekeeper Series, 
No. 135. London: International Institute for Environment and
Development.
Levkoe, C.Z., J. Brem-Wilson, and C.R. Anderson. 2018. People,
power, change: Three pillars of a food sovereignty research
praxis. The Journal of Peasant Studies 46 (7): 1389–1412.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1512488. 
Lowder, S.K., J. Skoet, and T. Raney. 2016. The number, size, and
distribution of farms, smallholder farms, and family farms world-
wide. World Development 87: 16–29. 
Luna, J.K. 2020. ‘Pesticides are our children now’: cultural change and
the technological treadmill in the Burkina Faso cotton sector.
Agriculture and Human Values 37: 449–462. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s10460-019-09999-y. 
Luna, J.K., and B. Dowd-Uribe. 2020. Knowledge politics and the Bt
cotton success narrative in Burkina Faso. World Development
136: 105127. 
Luskin, R.C., I. O’Flynn, J.S. Fishkin, and D. Russell. 2014. Deliberat-
ing across deep divides. Political Studies 62 (1): 117.
Marks, S. and G. Paravicini. 2018. How Syngenta won the war over
weed killers. Politico. 27 March 2018. https://www.politico.eu/
article/how-syngenta-swiss-agrichemical-avoided-weedkiller-
pesticide-ban-despite-safety-concerns-eu-commission/. Accessed
5 October 2020. 
Martinez Palacios, J. 2016. Equality and diversity in democracy: How
can we democratize inclusively? Equality, Diversity and Inclu-
sion: an International Journal 35 (5/6): 350–363. https://doi.org/
10.1108/EDI-04-2016-0030. 
Mies, M. 2014. Patriarchy and accumulation on a world scale: Women
in the international division of labour. London: Zed Books. 
Mignolo, W.D. 2007. Delinking: The rhetoric of modernity, the logic
of coloniality and the grammar of de-coloniality. Cultural Studies
21 (2–3): 449–514. https://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162647. 
Mignolo W. D. and C.E. Walsh. 2018. On decoloniality. Concepts,
analytics, praxis. Durham: Duke University Press.
Mittal, A. and M. Moore. 2009. Voices from Africa. The Oakland Insti-
tute. https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/
fles/voicesfromafrica_full.pdf. Accessed 18 February 2021. 
Monsanto Tribunal. 2016. Human rights violations, crimes against
humanity and ecocide, legal case prepared for The Monsanto
Tribunal held on 15–16 October 2016, The Hague. https://www.
monsanto-tribunal.org. Accessed 3 October 2020. 
Montenegro de Wit, M. 2020. Democratizing CRISPR? Stories, prac-
tices, and politics of science and governance on the agricultural
gene editing frontier. Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene.
https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.405. 
Moseley, W.G. 2005. Global cotton and local environmental manage-
ment: the political ecology of rich and poor farmers in southern
Mali. Geography Journal 171: 36–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
1475-4959.2005.00148.x. 
Moseley, W.G., M.A. Schnurr, and R. Bezner Kerr. 2017. Africa’s
green revolution: Critical perspectives on new agricultural tech-
nologies and systems. New York: Routledge.
Ndung’u, N. and L. Signé. 2020. The Fourth Industrial Revolution and 
digitization will transform Africa into a global powerhouse. In:
Foresight Africa: Top priorities for the continent 2020–2030.
Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
Neajai Pailey, R. 2019. De-centring the ‘White Gaze’ of development.
Development and Change 51 (3): 729–745. https://doi.org/10.
1111/dech.12550. 
Ngugi, W.T. 1986. Decolonising the mind. The politics of language in
African literature. Rochester: James Currey.
Nipon, A.R., M. DeGraeve, and W. Elsen. 2017. De la Françafrique à
la corruption : les dessous de la flière coton au Burkina Faso.
Basta Mag, 28 February 2017. 
OECD. 2020. Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic
Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave. Paris: OECD
Publishing at https://doi.org/10.1787/339306da-en. Accessed 5
October 2020. 
O’Flynn, I. 2007. Divided societies and deliberative democracy. British
Journal of Political Science 37 (4): 731–751.
Parkinson, J. and J. Mansbridge. 2014. Deliberative Systems. Delib-
erative Democracy at the Large Scale. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Patel, R. 2013. The long green revolution. Journal of Peasant Studies
40 (1): 1–63.
Peeters, M.A. 2020. The African palaver tradition and the western
postmodern consensus: convergences and divergences. Dialogue
Dynamics. Institute for Intercultural Dialogue Dynamics http://
dialoguedynamics.com/content/forum-d-apprentissage/modul
es/consensus-palabre/article/the-african-palaver-tradition-and. 
Accessed 25 September 2020.
People’s Knowledge Editorial Collective (Eds). 2017. Everyday
Experts: How people’s knowledge can transform the food system.
Reclaiming Diversity and Citizenship Series. Coventry: Coventry
University. www.coventry.ac.uk/everyday-experts. Accessed 5
October 2020. 
Pimbert, M.P. 2018a. Food sovereignty, agroecology and biocultural
diversity: Constructing and contesting knowledge. London:
Routledge.
Pimbert, M.P. 2018b. Democratizing knowledge and ways of know-
ing for food sovereignty, agroecology, and biocultural diversity.
In Food sovereignty, agroecology and biocultural diversity:




          
 
         
           
   
 
        
          
 






      





    
    
 
 












            




           








       
            









       
 
 
     




        
 





       
       
 
           
 
 
Constructing and contesting knowledge, ed. M.P. Pimbert, 259– 
321. London: Routledge.
Pimbert, M. P. and Wakeford, T. 2001. Deliberative democracy and
citizen empowerment. PLA Notes 40, IIED. Co-published by the 
Commonwealth Foundation, ActionAid, DFID, Sida and IIED,
https://pubs.iied.org/6345IIED/?k=Pimbert+and+wakeford. 
Accessed 2 October 2020. 
Pimbert, M.P. and T. Wakeford. 2002. ’Prajateerpu’: food and farm-




Pimbert, M.P., and T. Wakeford. 2003. Prajateerpu, power and knowl-
edge: The politics of participatory action research in develop-
ment, Part 1: Context, process and safeguards’. Action Research
1 (2): 185–207. https://doi.org/10.1177/14767503030012004. 
Pimbert, M.P., T. Wakeford, and P.V. Satheesh. 2003. Des petits pay-
sans et des marginaux ruraux s’expriment sur l’agriculture et les
OGM. La Revue Durable 6: 34–39. 
Pimbert, M.P., B. Barry, A. Berson and K. Tran-Thanh. 2011. Democ-
ratising Agricultural Research for Food Sovereignty in West
Africa, the International Institute for Environment and Devel-
opment (IIED), the Coordination Nationale des Organizations
Paysannes (CNOP), le Centre Djoliba, l’Institut de Recherche
et de Promotion des Alternatives en Dévelppement (IRPAD),
Kene Conseils, l’Union des Radios et Télévisions Libres du Mali
(URTEL), Bamako and London. https://pubs.iied.org/sites/defau
lt/fles/pdfs/migrate/14603IIED.pdf. Accessed 23 April 2021.
Pimbert, M.P., P. V. Satheesh, A. Argumedo and T. M. Farvar. 2017.
Participatory action research transforming local food systems in
India, Iran and Peru. In: Everyday Experts: How people’s knowl-
edge can transform the food system, Ed. People’s Knowledge
Editorial Collective, 99–118. Coventry: Coventry University
Reclaiming Diversity and Citizenship Series. www.coventry.ac.
uk/everyday-experts. Accessed 23 September 2020.
Pretty, J.N., I.M. Guijit, J. Thompson, and I. Scoones. 1995. Participa-
tory action and learning: A trainer’s guide. London: IIED. 
Pio, O. 2007. Paris brade le coton subsaharien. Le Monde Diploma-
tique, September pp. 18–19.
Pray, C., J. Huang, R. Hu, and S. Rozelle. 2002. Five years of Bt cot-
ton in China—The benefts continue. The Plant Journal 31:
423–430. 
Purcell, J.P., and F.J. Perlak. 2004. Global impact of insect-resistant
(Bt) cotton. AgBioforum 7 (1–2): 27–30.
Qaim, M., and D. Zilberman. 2003. Yield efects of genetically modi-
fed crops in developing countries. Science 299 (5608): 900–902.
Ravetz, J.R. 2006. The no-nonsense guide to science. Oxford: New
Internationalist Publications. 
Reason, P., and H. Bradbury. 2013. The SAGE handbook of action
research: participative inquiry and practice, 2nd ed. London:
Sage Publications.
Republic of Mali. 2005. National biosafety framework project. Ministry
of Environment and Sanitation of Mali. STP/CIGQE: Bamako.
Robert, A.C. 2006. L’Afrique au secours de l’Occident. Paris: Les édi-
tions de l’Atelier. 
Rock, J. 2018. “We are not starving:” challenging genetically modifed 
seeds and development in Ghana. Culture, Agriculture, Food and
Environment. 41 (1): 15–23.
Rostbøll, C.F. 2009. Dissent, criticism, and transformative political
action in deliberative democracy. Critical Review of Interna-
tional Social and Political Philosophy 12 (1): 19–36.
Russell, G. 2018. Bill Gates at Edinburgh University to help fund GM
crop research. The National. 26th January 2018 https://www.
thenational.scot/news/15898513.bill-gates-edinburgh-university-
help-fund-gm-crop-research/. Accessed 22 February 2021. 
SAICM. 2019. Mali and Senegal communities monitoring pesticides.
Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management
(SAICM). United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).
http://www.saicm.org/Resources/SAICMStories/MaliandSen
egalcommunitiesmonitoringpesticides/tabid/5857/Default.aspx. 
Accessed on 15 November 2019. 
Salas, M.A., H. J. Tillmann, N. McKee and N. Shahzadi. 2010. Visu-
alisation in Participatory Programmes. How to Facilitate and
Visualise Participatory Group Processes. Dhaka, Bangladesh:
Southbound Press and UNICEF. 
Salleh, A. 2009. Eco-sufciency and global justice. Women write politi-
cal ecology. London: Pluto Press. 
Schnurr, M.A. 2015. GMO 2.0: Genetically modifed crops and the
push for Africa’s green revolution. Canadian Food Studies 2 (2):
201–208. 
Schnurr, M.A. 2019. Africa’s gene revolution: Genetically modifed
crops and the future of African agriculture. Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press.
Schurman, R. 2016. Building an alliance for biotechnology in Africa.
Journal of Agrarian Change 17 (3): 1–18.
Selva, M. 2006. Mali farmers reject GM crops as attack on their way
of life. Independent at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/africa/mali-farmers-reject-gm-crops-as-attack-on-their-
way-of-life-5337122.html. Accessed 23 September 2020.
Sen, A. 2003. Why democratization is not the same as westerniza-
tion: Democracy and its global roots. New Republic, 4 October:
28–36. 
Scheurich, J.J., and M.D. Young. 1997. Coloring epistemologies:
Are our research epistemologies racially biased? Educational
Researcher 26 (4): 4–16. https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X02
6004004. 
Schurman, R. 2017. Building an alliance for biotechnology in Africa.
Journal of Agrarian Change 17 (3): 441–458. 
Smith, G. 2009. Democratic innovations. Designing institutions for
citizen participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Squires, J. 2010. Beyond Multiple Inequalities: Transversal Intersec-
tionality, Diversity Mainstreaming and Participative Democ-
racy. Kvinder Køn Forskning. https://doi.org/10.7146/kkf.v0i2-3.
28017 
Sundberg, J. 2017. Feminist Political Ecology. In: International Ency-
clopedia of Geography: People, the Earth, Environment and
Technology. Eds. D. Richardson, N. Castree, M.F. Goodchild,
A. Kobayashi, W. Liu and R.A. Marston. https://doi.org/10.1002/
9781118786352.wbieg0804
Tabashnik, B.E., Y. Carrière, T.J. Dennehy, S. Morin, M.S. Sisterson,
R.T. Roush, A.M. Shelton, and J.-Z. Zhao. 2003. Insect resist-
ance to transgenic Bt crops: Lessons from the laboratory and
feld. Journal of Economic Entomology 96 (4): 1031–1038.
https://doi.org/10.1603/0022-0493-96.4.1031. 
Tate, S and D. Page. 2018. Whiteliness and institutional racism: Hid-
ing behind (un)conscious bias. Ethics and Education, 13 (1) pp.
141–155. ISSN 1744–9642. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.
2018.1428718 
Teft, J. 2004. Building on successes in African agriculture: Mali’s
White Revolution: smallholder cotton from 1960 to 2003. 2020
Vision Focus 12(5). Washington, DC: International Food Policy
Research Institute,. https://www.ifpri.org/publication/malis-
white-revolution-smallholder-cotton-1960-2003. 
Testart, J. 2015. L’Humanitude au pouvoir, Comment les citoyens peu-
vent decider du bien commun. Paris: Seuil. 
The New Humanitarian. 2008. Cooking with poison. 6 February 2008. 
https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/76613/mali-cooki
ng-poison. Accessed 8 October 2020. 
Tuhiwai Smith, L. 2012. Decolonizing methodologies: Research and







        












      
   
 










      
              
            

















Tsan, M., S. Totapally, M. Hailu, and B.K. Addom. 2019. The Digitali-
sation of African Agriculture Report 2018–2019. Wageningen:
CTA/Dalberg Advisers
UCS. 2017. Syngenta Harassed the Scientist Who Exposed Risks of
Its Herbicide Atrazine. Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS),
Washington DC. https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/syngenta-
harassed-scien- tist-who-exposed-risks-its-herbicide-atrazine.
Accessed 22 February 2021.
Visvanathan, S. 2005. Knowledge, justice and democracy. In: Science
and Citizens: Globalization and the Challenge of Engagement, 
Eds. M. Leach, I. Scoones and B. Wynne, 83–94. London: Zed
Books. 
Wakeford, T. and Pimbert, M.P. 2003. Power-reversals in Biotech-
nology: Experiments in democratization, Brighton: Institute of
Development Studies.
Wakeford, T., J. Singh, B. Murtuja, P. Bryant, and M.P. Pimbert. 2008. 
The jury is out: How far can participatory projects go towards
reclaiming democracy? In The SAGE handbook of action
research, ed. P. Reason and H. Bradbury, 333–349. London: Sage
Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781848607934
Wafula, D., M. Waithaka, J. Komen, and M. Karembu. 2012. Biosafety
legislation and biotechnology development gains momentum in
Africa. GM Crops & Food 3 (1): 72–77.
Winchester, H.P.M., and L. Browning. 2015. Gender equality in aca-
demia: A critical refection. Journal of Higher Education Policy
and Management 37 (3): 269–281. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600
80X.2015.1034427. 
Wironen, M.B., R. V. Bartlett and J. D. Erickson. 2019. Deliberation
and the Promise of a Deeply Democratic Sustainability Transi-
tion. Sustainability. dhttps://doi.org/10.3390/su11041023
Wirz, C.D., D.A. Scheufele, and D. Brossard. 2020. Societal debates
about emerging genetic technologies: Toward a science of public
engagement. Environmental Communication 14 (7): 859–864.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2020.1811478. 
Wise, T.A. 2020. Failing Africa’s Farmers: An Impact Assessment of
the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa. Global Develop-
ment and Environment Institute, Working Paper No 20.01, Tufts
University. 
WEF, 2018. Innovation with a Purpose: The role of technology innova-
tion in accelerating food systems transformation. Geneva: World
Economic Forum. 
Yárnoz, I. 2020. Confict and confict resolutions in Africa. The future
of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSM). Global Afairs and Strategic Stud-
ies. Universidad de Navarra. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-
afairs/detalle/-/blogs/confict-and-confict-resolutions-in-africa-
the-future-of-united-nations-multidimensional-integrated-stabi
lization-mission-in-mali-minusma-. Accessed 2 September 2020
Young, I.M. 1986. The ideal of community and the politics of difer-
ence. Social Theory and Practice 12 (1): 1–26. 
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to 
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional afliations. 
Michel P. Pimbert is Professor of Agroecology and Food Politics and
the Director of the Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience at
Coventry University (UK). His research interests include agroecology
and food sovereignty; the political ecology of biodiversity and natural
resource management; participatory action research methodologies;
and deliberative democratic processes. He works with networks of
small and family farmers, indigenous peoples, and4communities to
advance transdisciplinary and transformative ways of knowing that
regenerate local ecologies, economies and cultural diversity. 
Boukary Barry is a development professional actively engaged in criti-
cal refection and analysis of development models. He collaborates with
research and training institutes as well as development aid agencies,
including the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the
universities of Geneva and Coventry. Through trainings and long-term
participatory processes, he has helped strengthen small-scale producer
organisations in West Africa. 
